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Summary 
In 2013, approximately 18 % of member states GDP was spent on public 
procurement, making it a powerful tool for governments to use to further 
certain objectives.  
Traditionally, public procurement has been used for protectionist purposes 
to safeguard national industry from foreign competition, which is why the 
EU has chosen to regulate this area of law to ensure the proper functioning 
of the internal market.  
 
Environmental concern in public procurement was for long distrusted in the 
EU for merely acting as a cloak for national protectionist objectives.  As 
environmental policy gradually gained recognition in the EU over time, so 
did green public procurement (GPP) as a policy instrument to achieve 
environmental as well as economic objectives.  
 
On 11 February 2014, a new public procurement directive was adopted by 
the Council to help deliver the Europe 2020 strategy. This economic 
strategy was formulated in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 and 
sought to rectify imperfections in the EU growth model by focusing on 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 
 
The Europe 2020 strategy identified GPP as a key market-based instrument 
to achieve the objective of sustainable growth by supporting the transition to 
a resource efficient and low carbon economy.  
The rationale for promoting GPP is that contracting authorities, as 
financially strong market actors, can shape production and consumption 
patterns to work for a sustainable use of resources, which will be beneficial 
both to the environment, as well as the economy as a whole. 
 
This thesis aims to examine, from a law and economics perspective, the 
conditions for GPP to function as an efficient policy instrument in terms of 
contributing to a sustainable development, as described in the Europe 2020 
strategy. The innovative solutions presented in the new procurement 
directive to the deficiencies of the preceding directive is the point of 
departure for an assessment of GPP’s efficiency as it is currently regulated.  
 
The presentation shows that a series of obstacles currently face the 
mobilisation of GPP in the EU. The possibility to incorporate environmental 
criteria in procurement is no longer in question but the legality of a 
particular use of GPP depends largely on how a contracting authority 
formulates its environmental criteria. The elaboration of environmental 
criteria in line with EU law that generate environmental and economic 
benefits is a technically challenging task that gives rise to high transaction 
costs.  
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The current high costs and complex execution of GPP discourages 
contracting authorities from engaging in GPP, which undermines the 
possibility for GPP to support the shift towards a sustainable development.   
The uptake of GPP also varies a lot between member states, which is due to 
a lack of political leadership and a fragmented public procurement demand.  
 
The new public procurement directive proposes a number of solutions to 
encourage an increased uptake of GPP among contracting authorities by 
facilitating and clarifying the use of GPP. Indicative targets have also been 
set by the Commission to further emphasise the importance of a wide use of 
GPP in the EU.  
 
The thesis, however, show that the promotion of GPP is rarely founded in 
economic research or studies establishing GPP as an effective policy 
instrument to transform the market to become more sustainable.  
Market conditions such as the price sensitivity of producers and consumers 
in relation to changes in market prices can for example have a substantial 
effect on GPP’s ability to achieve sustainable development and should 
therefore be included in the assessment of its efficiency.  
 
In addition, the voluntary element of GPP might impede its objective to 
achieve sustainable development as economic actors can choose not to 
participate in GPP if the costs of complying with environmental criteria 
exceed the potential economic benefits that might be gained from being 
awarded with the contract. Ambitious environmental criteria are more likely 
to deter tenderers from participating in GPP, which questions GPP’s 
efficiency in generating substantial environmental benefits.  
It remains to be seen whether the implementation of the new public 
procurement directive will contribute to an improvement of the challenges 
currently facing the mobilisation of GPP.  
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Sammanfattning 
Under 2013 utgjorde värdet av medlemsstaternas offentliga upphandling 
ungefär 18 procent av deras BNP, vilket gör det till ett kraftfullt verktyg att 
använda för att främja vissa samhällsmål.   
Traditionellt sett så har offentlig upphandling använts i ett protektionistiskt 
syfte för att skydda nationell industri från utländsk konkurrens, vilket är en 
bidragande faktor till att EU har valt att lagstifta på området för att 
säkerställa en fungerande inre marknad.    
 
Miljöhänsyn i offentlig upphandling var länge misstrodd för att vara en 
täckmantel för nationella protektionistiska syften. 
I takt med att miljöpolicy fick en ökad betydelse i EU så förändrades även 
synen på grön offentlig upphandling (GPP) som ett viktigt instrument för att 
uppnå miljömässiga såväl som ekonomiska fördelar.   
 
Den 11 februari 2014 antogs ett nytt upphandlingsdirektiv av Rådet för att 
understödja Europa 2020-strategin. Denna ekonomiska strategi 
formulerades i efterdyningarna av finanskrisen 2008 och ämnade åtgärda 
brister i EU:s tillväxtmodell genom att fokusera på smart, hållbar och social 
tillväxt.  
 
Europa 2020-strategin identifierade GPP som ett väsentligt 
marknadsbaserat instrument för att uppnå hållbar tillväxt genom att stödja 
övergången till en resurseffektiv ekonomi med låga koldioxidutsläpp.  
Den logiska grunden för främjandet av GPP är att upphandlande 
myndigheter, som ekonomiskt starka marknadsaktörer, kan forma 
produktions- och konsumtionsmönster till att verka för en hållbar 
användning av naturtillgångar vilket främjar både miljön såväl som 
ekonomin i sin helhet.  
 
Syftet med denna uppsats är att, från ett rättsekonomiskt perspektiv, 
undersöka förutsättningarna för GPP att fungera som ett effektivt policy 
instrument i betydelsen att verka för en hållbar utveckling, som beskrivet i 
Europa 2020-strategin. De innovativa lösningarna som presenteras i det nya 
upphandlingsdirektivet som ett svar på bristerna i det föregående direktivet 
utgör utgångspunkten för en bedömning av GPP’s effektivitet som det för 
nuvarande är reglerat.  
 
Uppsatsens presentation visar att mobiliseringen av GPP i EU för nuvarande 
möter en rad hinder. Möjligheten att inkorporera miljökriterier i offentlig 
upphandling är inte längre ifrågasatt men legaliteten av en enskild 
användning av GPP beror i stor grad på hur den upphandlande myndigheten 
formulerar sina miljökriterier. Utformandet av miljökriterier i enlighet med 
EU rätt som genererar miljömässiga och ekonomiska fördelar är en tekniskt 
utmanande uppgift som ger upphov till höga transaktionskostnader.  
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De höga transaktionskostnaderna och det komplicerade utövandet av GPP 
gör att upphandlande myndigheter ofta avstår från att tillämpa miljökriterier, 
vilket underminerar möjligheten för GPP att verka för en hållbar utveckling.  
Tillämpningen av GPP varierar också mycket mellan olika medlemsstater 
vilket antas bero på en brist på politiskt ledarskap och en fragmenterad 
offentlig efterfrågan av GPP. 
 
Det nya offentliga upphandlingsdirektivet presenterar en rad lösningar 
menade att uppmuntra en utökad tillämpning av GPP bland upphandlande 
myndigheter genom att underlätta och klargöra dess användande. Indikativa 
mål har också fastställts av Kommissionen för att ytterligare understryka 
vikten av en ökad tillämpning av GPP i EU.  
 
Denna uppsats visar emellertid på att främjandet av GPP sällan grundar sig i 
ekonomisk forskning eller studier som fastställer att GPP faktiskt är ett 
effektivt policyinstrument som kan bidra till att förändra marknaden i en 
hållbar riktning.  
Marknadsförutsättningar såsom priskänsligheten hos producenter och 
konsumenter i förhållande till förändrade marknadspriser kan exempelvis ha 
en betydande effekt på GPP’s förmåga att åstadkomma en hållbar 
utveckling och borde därför ingå i en bedömning av dess effektivitet.  
 
Därutöver är det frivilligt för producenter att delta i GPP, vilket kan 
motverka dess målsättning att bidra till en hållbar utveckling då ekonomiska 
aktörer kan välja att inte delta i GPP om kostnaderna för att uppfylla 
miljökriterier överstiger de potentiella ekonomiska fördelarna som följer av 
att vinna en upphandling. Det är också mer troligt att potentiella 
anbudsgivare väljer att avstå från att delta i en grön offentlig upphandling 
om miljökraven är högt ställda, vilket ifrågasätter GPP’s effektivitet i 
förhållande till att generera betydelsefulla miljövinster.  
Det återstår att se om implementeringen av det nya direktivet i nationell 
lagstiftning kommer att bidra till en förbättring av de utmaningar som för 
tillfället möter mobiliseringen av GPP.    
 
 
 
 
 5 
Preface 
This thesis marks the end of an academic era that for long seemed never-
ending and it is with mixed emotions and a great deal of optimism that I 
now embark on a new chapter of my life.  
 
First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Sanja Bogojevíc, whose inspiring 
and engaging lectures in EU environmental law inspired me to write my 
thesis within this area of law.  
 
Second, I wish to extend a great deal of gratitude to the love of my life, 
Anton Schleenvoigt, who has stood by me through thick and thin and 
continues to support me in everything I do.  
  
Lund would also not have been the same if I had not met my Gothenburgian 
sole mate Nenne Gavin. I am deeply grateful that I met you.  
 
A special thank you goes out to me beloved parents for always believing in 
me and for allowing me to move back home for a short period of time in 
order to finish this thesis.  
 
I also want to thank my very best friend Frida Hugne who still continues to 
live life by the fullest, dedicated to the philosophy that the sky is the limit.  
 
Lastly, I would like to extend a small thank you to my beloved cat friend 
Morris who provided emotional support throughout the writing of this thesis 
by taking numerous naps on doctrine and print-outs of Commission 
communications that he deemed irrelevant to this thesis.   
 
 
 
Emelie Eriksson 
 
Karlshamn, May 27th 2014. 
 6 
Abbreviations 
 
 
CBA  Cost and Benefit Analysis 
 
CJEU  Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
CPB  Centralised Purchasing Body 
 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
 
GPA  Government Procurement Agreement 
 
GPP  Green Public Procurement 
 
LCA  Life Cycle Costing Analysis 
 
LCC  Life Cycle Costing Assessment 
 
TEU  Treaty on European Union 
 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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”When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the 
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his 
strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next is either to kill 
him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal. For the rational study of 
the law the black letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of 
the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.” 
 
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, 1897 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Public procurement is the practice whereby a public authority procures from 
the market the goods, works and services it needs in order to fulfil its 
obligations.1 These obligations give rise to a wide range of transactions in 
the public market, such as procuring new stationery for a municipality or 
commissioning large-scale projects for the construction of public roads.  
 
Public procurement has attracted much regulatory action in the EU for its 
potential to influence the internal market objective.2 In 1988, the 
Commission identified public procurement as a significant non-tariff barrier 
to trade and the reason was two-folded.3  
 
First, public procurement is an economic activity involving considerable 
economic strength. Approximately 18 % of member states GDP4 is spent on 
procurement, which makes it a powerful tool for governments to use to 
further certain objectives. Traditionally, such objectives have included 
protectionist measures to safeguard national industry by e.g. favouring 
national tenderers and excluding foreign firms from access to their 
procurement market. Governments are generally prone to such behaviour 
and it is therefore crucial for the EU to regulate procurement in order to 
ensure the functioning of the internal market.5 
 
Second, the identity of the procurer in a market context creates a need for 
regulation. Public bodies can act as any market operator when procuring 
goods, works and services but should not be equated with simpler 
organisations. Public bodies are characterized by their complex structure, 
their significant size, disparate obligations and political and social 
objectives.6  
 
The objectives of public entities are part of what differentiate them from 
private entities. Where private entities seek to maximize their profit in a 
competitive market context, public entities pursue objectives of providing 
services to the public without market pressures. This lack of commercial 
pressure has instigated legislative action in the EU to ensure a sound and 
efficient use of public economic resources, which is otherwise underpinned 
by strong competition, and to decrease the proneness to protectionism and 
corruption in public procurement.7 
                                                
1 Arrowsmith and Kunzlik, 2009. p. 9 
2 Bovis, 2006, p. 12 
3 Commission, 1988 
4 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140110IPR32386/ 
5 Arnould, 2004, p. 187-188 
6 Trepte, 2004, p. 6 
7 Bovis, 2012, p. 1 
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Free trade theory is what underlines the creation of the EU single market.8 
According to this theory, the opening up of national markets to international 
trade will create prosperity and secure peace in Europe. 
The economic objective of protecting the single market by opening up 
national markets to undistorted competition still remain today but is now 
complemented by a variety of other objectives acknowledged by the EU, 
such as social objectives to encourage employment of the disabled or 
environmental objectives of reducing environmental harm.9  The EU is thus 
a multi-valued international organisation where the maximization of wealth 
by free trade is no longer the predominant policy.10  
 
Political and social objectives are thus becoming increasingly important 
alongside economic objectives in the EU. The new directive on 
procurement, adopted by the Council on 11 February 2014, provides a 
perfect example of this development as the modernized directive stems from 
the Europe 2020 strategy, which is an economic policy that inter alia 
emphasises the importance of integrating environmental concern in 
procurement to achieve benefits of enhanced competitiveness and 
sustainable growth.11 
 
The Commission elaborated the Europe 2020 strategy in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis of 2008. The strategy is, however, not confined to finding 
a remedy for the repercussions of the recession in the short term. The 
Commission also seeks to transform the current European growth model in 
the long term by promoting a smarter, more sustainable and inclusive 
growth.12  
 
Green public procurement (GPP) as a policy instrument is identified as 
being instrumental to achieve the objective of sustainable growth by 
supporting the transition to a resource efficient and low carbon economy.13   
  
GPP has been defined by the Commission as “a process whereby public 
authorities seek to procure goods, services and works with a reduced 
environmental impact throughout their life-cycle when compared to goods, 
services and works with the same primary function that would otherwise be 
procured”.14  
 
This definition means that contracting authorities are now able to take into 
account environmental concern in procurement and also compare tenders on 
the basis of environmental performance. The core of GPP is thus the 
                                                
8 Arrowsmith, 2010, p. 44  
9 McCrudden, 2007, p. 25 
10 Caranta and Trybus, 2010, pp. 16-17 
11http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/reform/fa
ct-sheets/fact-sheet-07-environmental_en.pdf 
12 Commission, 2010  
13 Bovis, 2012, p. 1   
14 Commission, 2008  
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ambition to avoid or limit environmental harm when procuring goods or 
services from the market.  
 
The central role of GPP not only in EU environmental policy but also at the 
core of its economic strategy marks a shift in the policy context of the EU. 
Where it was once discredited for curtaining national protectionist measures, 
it is now essential in ensuring the future competitiveness of the EU.15  
 
1.2 Purpose and question formulations 
The Europe 2020 strategy sets out high ambitions for the EU growth model 
to become more sustainable. Sustainable development is to be achieved by 
decoupling economic growth from an inefficient use of resources and 
environmental degradation.16 Sustainable development is thus an expression 
of the EU rhetoric that economic and environmental objectives can in fact 
be aligned, which is interesting considering that the two policy strands have 
previously been conceived of as antagonistic and polemic.17  
 
GPP has been described in the Europe 2020 strategy as a key policy 
instrument to attain the objective of sustainable development. The rationale 
for GPP is that contracting authorities, as financially strong market actors, 
can shape production and consumption patterns to work for a sustainable 
use of resources, which will be beneficial both to the environment, as well 
as the economy as a whole.18  
 
After the elaboration of the Europe 2020 strategy, the Commission found it 
necessary to modernize the former procurement directive to facilitate a 
wider use of GPP and further elevate its status.19  
A wider use of GPP is thus strongly promoted in the EU with high 
expectations on positive environmental and economic outcomes. Yet, few 
studies have been conducted to establish if GPP is an effective policy 
instrument to achieve sustainable growth, especially from an economic 
perspective, and how it should be used to best achieve the desirable 
results.20  
 
The purpose of this study is therefore to examine the conditions for GPP to 
function as an efficient policy instrument in terms of generating a maximum 
of environmental and economic benefits. The innovative solutions presented 
in the new directive to the deficiencies of the former will be the point of 
departure for an assessment of GPP’s efficiency as it is currently regulated.  
  
                                                
15 Kunzlik, 2013, p. 102 
16 Commission, 2008 
17 Lee, 2005, pp. 26-28 
18 Commission, 2008, p. 2 
19 Directive 2004/18/EC 
20 SOU 2013:12, p. 376 
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The study from a law and economics perspective of the conditions for GPP 
to function as an efficient policy instrument will ultimately help answer: 
 
To what extent does GPP, as presented in the Europe 2020 strategy, meet 
the objective of promoting sustainable development in the EU?   
 
1.3 Method and material  
The initial method to be used in this study is the traditional legal method in 
order to establish the legislative framework applicable to public 
procurement. Accordingly, relevant legislation, preparatory work on 
proposed laws, case law and legal doctrine will be examined to set a 
taxonomy for public procurement regulation.  
 
The focal point of this thesis is EU law as the major influence on national 
regulation on procurement derives from secondary legislation, primary law, 
and case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 
Domestic law will also be addressed to a lesser extent to discuss the 
practical implications of the EU GPP regulation. Swedish law will be the 
sole object of study in this regard.   
 
Furthermore, the analysis of GPP as a policy instrument will be conducted 
from a Swedish perspective, using government official reports and stated 
opinions from interested parties such as the Swedish Competition Authority 
and the Expert group in studies of public finance21. Swedish experiences of 
incorporating environmental criteria are especially valuable since Sweden is 
one of four top performing EU countries in GPP performance22, meaning 
procurement processes where at least one of the EU “core” GPP criteria has 
been used.23   
 
Commission guidelines and communications will also be assessed since the 
Commission has become a strong political actor in the development of GPP 
in the EU and issues policy documents important to this area of law. 
Commission communications are not legally binding but represent the 
Commission’s position on certain topics and may represent future intentions 
to initiate legislative action.24  
 
As GPP is described in the Europe 2020 strategy as a market-based policy 
instrument, it is inescapable to address its interdisciplinary character of 
incorporating economic theory with the law.  
                                                
21 Expertgruppen för studier i offentlig ekonomi (ESO) 
22 CEPS Report, 2012 
23 EU GPP criteria are common environmental criteria that can be used by contracting 
authorities of the member states in their procurement processes. The “core” criteria of EU 
GPP criteria constitute the essential elements of a product’s environmental performance. 
See section 4.3.1.2.  
24 http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/glossary/glossary_en.htm#Communication 
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The method used in this study will therefore not be limited to traditional 
legal method, but also encompass an economic analysis of existing law.  
Economic analysis of law, also known as law and economics, is concerned 
with assessing law from an external economic perspective. The perspective 
is external in the sense that it finds the logic of the law outside of the law 
itself. This logic is the maximization of economic efficiency or wealth.25 
 
Applying economic analysis of law to GPP regulation therefore involves an 
assessment of its efficiency in terms of the ability to maximize common 
wealth. Economic analysis of law is rather flexible and can be used to 
evaluate the efficiency of a regulation related to economic as well as non-
economic objectives, e.g. environmental protection.26 Such an analysis is 
therefore particularly valuable for the evaluation of GPP as this instrument 
is meant to attain objectives of both an economic as well as a non-economic 
nature.  
 
Law and economics scholarship has shown that economic efficiency can be 
measured using one of two standards, either the pareto efficiency standard 
or the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency standard (also known as the compensation 
principle).27 
 
Pareto efficiency is acquired when a certain action or a measure increases 
wealth for at least one individual without decreasing wealth for another 
individual. For example, if a certain regulation entail that purchasers get a 
significant reduction in their expenses while the suppliers are not 
economically affected by the regulation.  
Pareto efficiency is particularly hard to attain in regulation, as different legal 
measures are often a result of a compromise between opposing interests in 
society where some individuals gain advantages from a regulation and 
others do not.28  
 
The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency standard is therefore easier to apply, as specific 
regulation can be considered efficient even if some actors are disadvantaged 
by it, provided that the total benefits achieved by the measure outweigh the 
costs. This standard is also called the compensation principle, as the 
advantaged group must, in theory, be able to compensate the disadvantaged 
group and still keep a surplus of benefits.29 
Regulation usually creates both winners and losers, which is why the 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency standard is most frequently used in law and 
economics analysis.30 GPP regulation is certainly no exception as producers 
of conventional products will often be disadvantaged compared to producers 
providing eco-friendly products.  
 
                                                
25 Posner, 1979, p. 103 ff 
26 Korling and Zamboni, 2013, pp. 178-179 
27 KKV, 2009, p. 16 
28 Hovenkamp, 1989-90, p. 1037 
29 Dahlman, Glader and Reidhav, 2004, p. 54 
30 Mercuro and Medema, 2006, p. 105 
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This thesis will thus apply the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency standard to assess 
GPP regulation as presented in the new directive on procurement. The 
efficiency will be evaluated in terms of whether GPP is an efficient 
instrument to use to generate benefits for the environment and the economy 
as a whole that outweigh the costs of engaging in GPP.  
The environmental benefits that GPP is expected to generate are primarily 
reduced levels of carbon emissions through a sustainable use of natural 
resources. The economic benefits are expected to follow from the 
environmental benefits as resources are used more efficiently and 
competitive green markets are created and expanded due to an increased 
public demand in green goods.31 This is ultimately meant to enhance the 
EU’s competitiveness and make the EU less reliant on foreign sources for 
raw materials and commodities.32 
Economic analysis of law will help to show economic weaknesses in EU 
GPP regulation as it is currently formulated that also affects the expected 
environmental benefits to be generated by GPP.  
  
1.4 Delimitations 
First of all, this thesis does not claim to provide a comprehensive evaluation 
of the public procurement process of the EU. The aim of this study is to 
assess the efficiency of using GPP in the EU to attain sustainable 
development from a law and economics perspective. The presentation of the 
procurement process in large therefore serves the purpose of demonstrating 
the possibilities and limitations for GPP in the EU, which will allow a 
subsequent evaluation of GPP’s efficiency.  
 
The assessment of GPP’s efficiency in attaining policy objectives is 
however a complex undertaking, especially since it includes non-economic 
objectives such as environmental protection that are hard to measure and 
monetize. The lack of empirical data on the effects of using GPP33, as 
mentioned above, further limits the scope of an efficiency analysis.  
 
This thesis will therefore present the legal and economic conditions for GPP 
to function efficiently by assessing the challenges facing the mobilisation of 
GPP in the EU and the possible solutions to these challenges presented in 
the new directive on procurement.  
Consequently, the thesis will not provide a definitive answer as to if GPP is 
an efficient policy instrument in terms of promoting sustainable 
development, since it depends on a wide range of factors such as how the 
market will in fact react to an increased uptake of GPP criteria by 
contracting authorities and how authorities should conduct their 
procurement processes to best achieve desired environmental and economic 
benefits. These factors will, however, be presented in the thesis to allow a 
                                                
31 Commission, 2010, p. 15 
32 Commission, 2008, p. 2 
33 ESO 2013:10, p. 29 
 14 
discussion of whether it is reasonable to suggest that GPP will be efficient in 
achieving environmental and economic objectives.  
 
This thesis will exclusively address public procurement in the classical 
sector. Procurement in the utilities sector, i.e. in the water, energy, transport 
and postal services sectors is often subject to a similar legal structure and 
many of the problems and measures presented in the classical sector are thus 
also valid for the utilities sector.34  
Furthermore procurements below the threshold values in the directives will 
only be mentioned in brief as somewhat simplified regulation apply to them.  
 
1.5 Disposition 
This thesis is divided into three core parts. The first part aims to present the 
legislative framework of the EU procurement regulation including a brief 
account of the Swedish procurement order and a concise description of 
relevant international agreements. The idea is to provide an overview of the 
procurement process and its underlying economic incentives. 
 
The second part focuses on GPP in particular and how this policy 
instrument has become one of the key market-based instruments in the 
policy landscape of the EU.  
First, EU environmental policy will be assessed to portray how 
environmental concern has gained recognition over time. Second, the EU 
general policies will be presented to understand the motives behind 
identifying GPP as a key market-based instrument. 
Third, relevant case law of European Court of Justice (ECJ) to the legal area 
of GPP will be thoroughly evaluated, as it has been instrumental to the 
development and acceptance of environmental concern in procurement. The 
balancing exercise of the ECJ between the internal market objective and 
environmental concern will be of particular interest.  
 
The third part will use the findings of the two previous sections to discuss 
the efficiency of using GPP to achieve sustainable development from a law 
and economics perspective. 
The new directive on procurement adopted by the Council on 11 February 
2014 will be evaluated in light of the deficiencies of the former directive of 
2004. The presentation will aim at answering whether the new directive 
present efficient solutions, in terms of facilitating a wider use of GPP, to 
challenges currently facing the mobilisation of GPP. This section will 
finally include a discussion of the market conditions that are a prerequisite 
for GPP to function efficiently.   
 
Lastly, this study will provide a well-founded analysis of whether GPP 
should be promoted as a key policy instrument to achieve the objective of 
sustainable growth set out in the Europe 2020 strategy.  
                                                
34 KKV, 2009, p. 14 
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2 The legal framework of public 
procurement 
2.1 The EU procurement regime 
Mastering, or at least understanding the basic concepts of EU public 
procurement, demands a study of the underlying purpose of the EU 
procurement regime. This introductory section will therefore in brief 
describe one of the fundamental objectives of the EU, namely the internal 
market objective, and how it has influenced the elaboration of the EU 
procurement regime and why public procurement in general and GPP in 
particular can present a barrier to trade.  
 
The creation of a common “single” market, where there are no barriers to 
trade between the member states, represent the very foundation of the EU. 
This market is to be obtained by a progressive approximation of the 
economic policies of the member states.35  
A common market is meant to encourage transnational trade, which in turn 
is thought to maximize economic wealth and ensure peace in the European 
region. It is believed that an economic interdependence among member 
states will prevent future aggression. 36  
 
The European Commission has identified public procurement as a 
significant non-tariff barrier to trade.37 Such a barrier is often elusive in 
character as it is not as openly discriminatory as a tax on imported goods 
and services and can represent a significant restriction on trade due to the 
financial strength of its purchaser, the public authority.38 
 
Public authorities have previously been inclined to protect national industry 
by e.g. restraining foreign competitors from entering their market.39 Certain 
public contracts, such as infrastructure contracts, involve a considerable 
amount of financial means and therefore attract extensive economic activity. 
Public authorities can thus be put under a lot of political pressure to favour 
national industries as it creates jobs and generates money for the near 
community.   
Regulating public markets in a way to reduce the possibility for states to use 
procurement in such a way is thus an integral part in achieving the internal 
market objective.40  
 
                                                
35 Bovis, 2006, p. 9 
36 Arrowsmith, 2010, p. 44 
37 Commission, 1988 
38 Foster, 2013, p. 256-257 
39 Until 1952, the Swedish procurement regime included an explicit provision commanding 
public authorities to give precedence to domestic goods over foreign. (Pedersen, 2013, p. 9) 
40 Bovis, 2012. p. viii-ix 
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Using public procurement to promote environmental benefits present a 
particular threat to the internal market. Procurement for the promotion of 
policy objectives such as environmental protection does not necessarily 
have to be economically efficient. Instead, public bodies can conclude that a 
certain financial loss is tolerable in light of the objective to be attained.41 
 
The EU public procurement does not exclude the possibility for member 
states to take into consideration environmental objectives, especially as the 
present EU Treaties themselves expressly promote such objectives.42  
However, the pursuit of environmental objectives needs to be in line with 
EU law. A study of the legislative framework of public procurement is 
therefore crucial to grasp the possibilities as well as the limitations of GPP 
in particular. Relevant primary law addressing public procurement will first 
be presented before secondary law is assessed followed by national and 
international law.  
 
2.1.1 TFEU and the general principles of EU law 
The significance of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) on public procurement is expressly stated in recital 2 of the public 
sector directive of 2004.43  
The recital states that the award of public contracts among member states 
are subjected to the provisions of the Treaty concerning the free movement 
of goods and services and the freedom of establishment. The principles 
derived from the free movement provisions are equally to be respected when 
awarding a public contract. Contracts above a certain value will be subjected 
to the public sector directive for the purpose of coordinating national 
procedures for the award of contract. Secondary law is, however, still to be 
interpreted in accordance with the rules and principles of the Treaty.  
 
Recital 2 of the public sector directive reflect the idea that primary law 
constitute the foundation on which secondary law on the award of public 
contracts is formulated, even though the Treaty does not expressly regulate 
public procurement and the award of contracts. 
The significance of certain Treaty provisions in public procurement has 
instead been elaborated by the ECJ and the following description of relevant 
Treaty provisions will include some examples of case law from the ECJ.  
 
The Treaty provisions applicable to procurement are all intimately 
connected to the internal market objective, which is at the core of the legal 
efforts to regulate procurement. The creation of an internal market demands 
the abolition of discriminatory behaviour between member states. The 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality articulated in art 
18 TFEU is therefore instrumental to the internal market objective.  
                                                
41 Arrowsmith, 2010, p. 49 
42 See Recital 9, art 3(3) TEU and art 11, 191 TFEU, also section 3.1 
43 Directive 2004/18/EC 
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Art 18 is applicable in all areas of Community law where there are no 
special provisions on non-discrimination. As the free movement provisions 
constitute such special provisions, art 18 is of importance merely as 
supplementary regulation and also as an expression of the principle of equal 
treatment44, which will be further discussed below.  
 
The following section will describe the free movement provisions each in 
turn, with the exception of the free movement of people and capital45, and 
the general principles of EU law derived from these provisions.  
 
2.1.1.1 Free movement of goods (Art 34 TFEU)  
The free movement of goods is regulated in Article 34 TFEU and prohibits 
all quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent 
effect between member states. Quantitative restrictions on trade are 
measures, which put up a partial or total ban on imported or exported 
products.  
The landmark decision of Dassonville46 further clarified that measures 
having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions signify all measures 
capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
Community trade.  
 
The scope of application of art 34 is evidently large and covers measures 
that can be divided into three subcategories. The application of EU law 
might vary depending on which subcategory a particular measure adheres to 
and it is therefore of importance to describe the three types each in turn.  
 
The first and second type of measure either discriminates directly or 
indirectly between domestic and imported products. These measures are 
called distinctly and indistinctly applicable measures and are both 
discriminatory in their effect.47  
A requirement to use only domestic products in a construction contract48 
represent a distinctly applicable measure while a requirement that material 
for construction must conform to a domestic standard49 represent an 
indistinctly applicable measure.  
 
The third type of measure applies equally to domestic and imported 
products and is not even discriminatory in its effect. For these types of 
measures, the ECJ has made a distinction between measures that relate to 
the characteristics of a product and those that refer to the selling 
                                                
44 Sundstrand, 2012, p. 38 
45 For the purpose of public procurement, the free movement of people will not be 
addressed as employment contracts are expressly excluded from the public procurement 
regulation. (Sundstrand, 2013, p. 25, footnote 1). Furthermore, the free movement of capital 
will neither be addressed; as such rights do not constitute contracts that public bodies need 
to expose to competition. (Sundstrand, 2012,  p. 37) 
46 C-8/74 
47 Arrowsmith, 2010, p. 67-68 
48 C-234/89 
49 C-45/87 
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arrangements of a product.50 The requirement for a certain operative system 
to be used51 constituted an infringement of art 34 as it related to the 
characteristics of the product while for example rules on opening hours of a 
retail store fell outside the scope of art 34 TFEU.  
 
Contracting authorities seeking to engage in GPP must thus make sure that, 
for example, an environmental criterion does not discriminate directly or 
indirectly between domestic and imported goods or includes a specification 
on product characteristics that hinder trade. Authorities are for example 
prohibited from requiring that a public contract can only be awarded to 
domestic suppliers of green products or that possible tenderers must comply 
with domestic environmental standards without accepting equivalent foreign 
standards. Derogations from art 34 TFEU can however be justified under art 
36 TFEU if the measure in question seeks to safeguard objectives of public 
interest, such as the protection of health and life of humans, animals or 
plants and does not confer an unrestricted freedom of choice on the 
contracting authority. A measure with a potential impact on the trade of 
goods might also be justified on the basis of “mandatory requirements” 
acknowledged by the ECJ. Environmental protection is considered a 
mandatory requirement but such an objective must still be proportionate in 
relation to the goal to be attained.52  
 
2.1.1.2 Freedom to provide services (Art 56 TFEU) 
Art 56 TFEU includes an obligation for member states to guarantee access 
to EU citizens other than their nationals to exercise services within their 
territories. It is prohibited to restrict the freedom to provide services for EU 
citizens who are established in another state than the recipient of the service.  
It is equally prohibited to restrain suppliers of services from other member 
states from participating in government contracts.53 
 
Equal to art 34 TFEU, there are three types of measures that can violate the 
freedom to provide services.  
Distinctly applicable measures are those that discriminate directly on the 
grounds of nationality of the service provider. An obvious example can be 
found in an Italian case where a certain portion of a public works contract 
was reserved for subcontractors established in the region where the works 
were to be performed. This measure was directly discriminatory, 
notwithstanding that Italian subcontractors form other regions of Italy were 
equally discriminated.54  
 
Indistinctly applicable measures might include requirements of having an 
office open to the public in the province where the service is to be provided 
or an award criterion favouring firms who produce products needed to 
                                                
50 C-267-8/91 
51 C-359/93 
52 Arrowsmith, 2010, p. 74 
53 Arrowsmith, 2010, p. 70 
54 C-360/89 
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perform a service, within a certain distance from the province where the 
service is to be provided.55  
 
Measures that have an equal impact on domestic and foreign firms, just as 
any other measure having an impact on trade in services, are prima facie 
caught by art 56 TFEU as established by the ECJ.56 No restriction has been 
made to this general approach such as the one in the case of Keck & 
Mithouard. 
  
For the purpose of GPP, if a contracting authority requires tenderers to, e.g., 
provide evidence of environmental performance during the last 10 years of 
service, the authority must make sure that the requirement does not restrict 
access for tenderers to service markets, as art 56 TFEU covers all measures 
having an impact on trade in services. Measures taken to protect the 
environment can however be justified under art 62 TFEU, which refers back 
to art 52 TFEU, on grounds of public policy, morality or security. 
Hindrances to trade in services can equal to hindrances to trade in goods be 
justified by mandatory requirements established by the ECJ, including 
environmental protection.  
 
2.1.1.3 Freedom of establishment (Art 49 TFEU) 
Art 56 TFEU ensures the right for citizens of a member state to set up an 
agency, a branch or an affiliated company in another member state, on a 
permanent basis without having to worry about receiving a different 
treatment than nationals of the relevant state. Restrictions on these rights are 
strictly prohibited. In the context of public procurement, people established 
in another member state than their state of origin cannot be restricted from 
accessing public contracts. For example, a requirement that tenderers to 
certain data processing contracts had to be owned by the Italian government 
was considered discriminatory against non-Italian firms established in Italy, 
notwithstanding that Italian firms established in other regions of Italy were 
equally discriminated.57  
 
2.1.1.4 The general principles of EU law 
The general principles of EU law are meant to assist the interpretation of 
Community law, including both primary as well as secondary law, to ensure 
that regulation is applied in accordance with the EU Treaties and are given 
full effect in the legal areas governed by Community law.58 These principles 
have been given constitutional status59 and take precedent of both secondary 
law and international agreements signed by the EU.  
The more exact meaning of the general principles of EU law has largely 
been developed through the ECJ’s interpretation of the free movement 
                                                
55 C-234/03 
56 C-384/93 
57 C-3/88 
58 Sundstrand, 2012, p. 42  
59 C-101/08, para 63 
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provisions. The general principles thus emanate partly from primary law, 
partly from the case law of the CJEU60 and ultimately help secure a well 
functioning internal market.  
Some of the general principles of EU law underlie the public sector 
directive, as explicitly stated in recital 2 of the public sector directive 
2004/18/EC. Art 2 of the same directive directly refers to general principles 
of particular relevance to public procurement law, namely the principle of 
equal treatment61, the non-discrimination principle62 and the transparency 
principle.63 The CJEU has further acknowledged the principle of 
proportionality64 and the principle of mutual recognition65 to be of relevance 
to the legal field of procurement.   
The major part of the CJEU’s case law on public procurement make 
reference to the general principles and their significance for the 
interpretation of EU law on procurement can thus not be understated, as will 
be shown in the upcoming section regarding the case law of the CJEU66.   
 
Another general principle, relevant for GPP in particular, is the 
environmental integration principle that follows from art 11 TFEU and art 
37 in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This principle requires EU 
institutions as well as member states to integrate environmental concerns in 
their decision-making process to avoid environmental degradation and will 
be further assessed in the upcoming section regarding EU environmental 
law and policy.  
 
2.1.2 Directive 2004/18/EC 
2.1.2.1 Purpose 
The Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award 
of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service 
contracts (Public Sector Directive), was installed to induce efficiency in EU 
procurement regulation, to facilitate the application of the rules in member 
states, to create opportunities for member states to seek value for money and 
                                                
60 Pedersen, 2013, p. 19 
61 All suppliers submitting tenders must be treated equally and be given equal opportunities 
to be awarded with the contract. 
62 It is strictly prohibited to discriminate tenders directly or indirectly on grounds of 
nationality, e.g. giving priority to domestic suppliers as opposed to foreign.  
63 The contracting authority must give adequate information about the public contract and 
how the tenders will be assessed so that economic operators accordingly can draw up 
competitive tenders. The information given by the authority concerning the requirements 
and criteria to be used in the procurement process cannot be substantially changed during 
the process.  
64 The requirements and criteria used in procurement must be proportional to the purported 
objective. The requirements cannot go beyond what is necessary to achieve the purpose of 
the procurement. 
65 Certificates etc. issued by competent authorities of one member state must be accepted in 
the other member states provided that they correspond to certificates demanded in the 
procurement process.  
66 Sundstrand, 2012, p. 43, See section 3.3 
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to secure a fair and equal competition.67 Environmental concern was equally 
part of this modernisation effort, in accordance with the integration principle 
in art 11 TFEU, requiring environmental protection to be integrated into 
Community policy and activity, especially with a view to promote 
sustainable development,68 further discussed below.  
 
Previously, it had been discovered that a mere 20 % of all tenders in the EU 
were published in the Official Journal of the EU and only 10 % of the 
concluded procurement contracts in the EU were of a cross border nature.69   
 
The EU had discovered, already in the 1970s, that the free movement 
provisions were inadequate to ensure the proper functioning of public 
procurement in the EU as the Treaty made no explicit mention of public 
procurement.70 A need thereby arose to coordinate the procedures for the 
award of public contracts at Community level with secondary law and the 
first directive was adopted in 1971.71 Various directives followed from the 
original and the directive currently in effect from 2004 is a result of the 
previous.72  
 
The previous as well as the current directive on public procurement have all 
been founded on the free movement provisions and the principles derived 
there from. The purpose of the directives has always been to eliminate 
barriers to the freedom to provide services and goods, thereby protecting the 
interests of economic actors established in one member state who seek to 
provide services and goods to public authorities established in another 
member state.73 
The aim of the directives was thus to avoid both the risk of preferential 
behaviour towards domestic tenderers as well as the possibility for public 
authorities to be guided by non-economic considerations.74 
 
The public sector directive of 2004 was thought to help create an internal 
market for public contracts by subjecting public authorities to a great 
number of obligations and restrictions, which they are forced to respect 
when awarding public contracts.75  
 
The Directive was also meant to reflect the preceding case law of the ECJ 
who had elucidated the lawfulness of using social and environmental criteria 
in public procurement in four important cases, which will be discussed 
below.76  Directive 2004/18/EC was the first directive that expressly 
addressed the possibility for contracting authorities to take environmental 
                                                
67 Nielsen and Treumer, 2005, p. 9 
68 Directive 2004/18/EC, Recital 5 
69 ibid.  
70 Sundstrand, 2013, p. 28-29 
71 Directive 71/305/EEC 
72 Sundstrand, 2012, p. 58-59 
73 C-360/96, para 41 
74 C-380/98, para 17 
75 Troels and others, 2012, p. 25-26 
76 See section 3.3  
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concern into consideration in procurement. Authorities were now given the 
opportunity to incorporate environmental objectives in their technical 
specifications, contract performance conditions and award criteria when 
choosing the economically most advantageous tender. These possibilities 
will be mentioned in passing in the upcoming sections to allow a more 
thorough analysis in the subsequent section regarding GPP.  
 
2.1.2.2 Scope of application 
For the public sector directive to be applicable, two conditions must be met. 
 
The first involves the parties to a public contract. The Public Sector 
directive applies only to the award of public contracts between an economic 
operator and a contracting authority. The term “contracting authority” 
comprises a wide range of entities within the realm of State, regional or 
local governance as well as bodies governed by public law.77 
The term “economic operator” targets entities described as contractors, 
suppliers and service providers belonging to the private realm of trade.78    
 
The second condition involves the nature of the contract concerned. The 
Public Sector directive is only applicable to contracts in writing for 
pecuniary interest, meaning in money or moneys worth, having as their 
object the execution of works, supply of products or the provision of 
services.79 
Furthermore, the contract must be of a value exceeding the stated thresholds 
in the Public Sector Directive.80  
 
Certain public contracts are expressly excluded wholly or partially from the 
application of the directive. Public contracts belonging to the utilities sector 
such as water, energy and transport services are for example exempt from 
the scope of the directive.81 
Also, contracts that fall below the thresholds are exempted from the scope 
of the directive. These contracts are however still subjected to fundamental 
Treaty provisions, especially the non-discrimination principle in art 18 
TFEU, provided that the contract in question is of certain cross-border 
interest.82 
 
2.1.2.3 Procedures 
When a contracting authority is to award a public contract, which falls 
within the scope of the Public Sector Directive, five types of award 
procedures are made available for the authority. The procedures are 
described either as open, restricted, competitive or negotiated procedures 
                                                
77 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 1(9) 
78 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 1(8) 
79 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 1(2)(a), 
80 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 7, 
81 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 12 
82 C-507/03, para 29 
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with a notice or without. The open and restricted procedures will now be 
mentioned in brief as these are the most commonly used and do not require 
specific circumstances.83  
 
The general rule is that contracting authorities have the liberty to choose 
between the open and the restricted procedure when awarding any public 
contract.84 They are both formal tendering procedures where a contracting 
authority is obliged to determine clear specifications as the basis for the 
submission of bids, advertise the contract in the EU’s Official Journal and 
evaluate the bids on objective criteria without extensive negotiations with 
the interested parties.85 
 
Similar rules apply to the two procedures yet there are differences. The open 
procedure is open in the sense that any interested economic operator can 
submit a tender.86 The restricted procedure on the other hand is restricted in 
the sense that economic operators can request to participate but may only 
submit a tender if they are invited to do so after the selection stage by the 
contracting authority.87  
 
2.1.2.4 Qualification and award criteria 
The Public Sector Directive distinguishes between two sets of criteria. The 
first set of criteria is aimed at establishing whether a supplier is able to 
perform a contract and the second to establish which of the qualified 
suppliers will be awarded the contract.  
The public procurement process is thus divided into two separate stages 
regulated by different provisions.88  
 
The first is the selection stage where tenders are selected on the basis of 
certain predetermined criteria stipulated in the Public Sector Directive.  
The process of selecting tenderers, as the process for the award of contract, 
is strictly regulated to prevent contracting authorities from impeding fair 
opportunities for participation for tenderers and conceal discriminatory 
behaviour. 89 The discretion of the member states are thus limited in the 
sense that they can only select economic operators on certain grounds listed 
in the Public Sector Directive to which financial standing and technical 
                                                
83 PwC, 2011, p. 4-5 
84 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 28. Previously, authorities had to justify the use of the 
restricted procedure but it is now placed on an equal footing with the open procedure. The 
member states can, however, require the open procedure to be used as a main rule, as 
member states are allowed to impose stricter regulation than the directive.  
85 Arrowsmith, 2010, p. 132-133 
86 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 1(11)(a) 
87 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 1(11)(b) 
88 The separate stages of the public procurement process were established already in C-
31/87, para 15, where the Court found that an examination of a contractor’s suitability to 
perform a contract preceded an assessment of which contractor should be awarded with the 
contract.  
89 Arrowsmith, 2010, p. 141 
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capacity are the two most important criteria.90 Furthermore, the directive 
also controls the evidence that may be used to justify exclusion. 
 
In addition to technical capacity and financial standing, criteria aimed at the 
personal situation of the tenderer, involving the professional honesty, 
solvency and reliability of the tenderer, can be used to exclude tenderers91, 
for example if a tenderer has been convicted of a serious crime or has failed 
to pay its taxes. Authorities may also require tenderers to be enrolled on 
certain trade or professional registers in their state of establishment.92  
 
The second stage is the award of contract where the contractor who has 
submitted the best tender is chosen. The purpose of regulating how a 
contracting authority is to decide which contractor has submitted the best 
tender is to ensure a transparent procurement process where the authority is 
prevented from concealing discriminatory behaviour.93 
A contract can be awarded either to the contractor having submitted the 
tender with the lowest prince for performance or the tender which is the 
most economically advantageous.94 
 
The lowest price basis is often used when a contracting authority seek to 
procure items of a simple nature where the quality does not vary a lot 
among suppliers.  
 
The most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) criteria however, 
allow member states to take into consideration other factors than the lowest 
price such as quality, production costs, after sales service and delivery 
date.95 
The Public Sector directive provides a list of factors that can be considered 
by a contracting authority if the award of contract is based on the MEAT-
criteria in art 53. Environmental characteristic is expressly stated as a factor 
that can be considered as opposed to the previous directives where it was 
only implied. This list is not exhaustive but if an authority chooses to use 
factors not listed in the directive, the factor must be linked to the subject 
matter of the contract96 and of course be aimed only at identifying the 
economically most advantageous tender.97 This requirement is set up to 
ensure that the use of the MEAT-criteria does not confer an unrestricted 
freedom of choice on the contracting authority.98 
 
Furthermore, if the MEAT-criteria are to be used, the contracting authority 
must reveal these criteria and their relative weighting in the contract notice 
                                                
90 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 44, Art 47 
91 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 45 
92 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 46 
93 Arrowsmith, 2010, p. 168 
94 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 53 
95 Arrowsmith and Kunzlik, 2009, p. 106 
96 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 53(1)(a) 
97 C-31/87, para 19 
98 C-19/00, para 37 
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or in the contract documents.99 The weighting can be expressed in 
percentage or in other ways such as points systems.100 The requirement for 
weighting and prior notice enables contracting authorities and tenderers to 
verify whether a tender meets a certain award criteria, thereby ensuring the 
principle of equal treatment by inducing transparency and objectivity in the 
tender process.101 
 
2.1.2.5 Technical specification 
Recital 26 and art 23 of the Public Sector Directive govern the rules on 
technical specifications. Technical specifications include every technical 
prescription by the contracting authority, which define the characteristics of 
a product, service or works subject to procurement, in a way to fulfil the use 
for which it is intended.102 
Examples of technical specifications can be requirements on certain product 
and methods of production, certain levels of environmental protection or 
certain quality assurances and design. Technical specification is therefore an 
important tool for the contracting authority to use to further environmental 
objectives.  
 
The rules in the Public Sector Directive are applicable to technical 
specifications in the absence of mandatory national technical rules in the 
member state of the procuring authority. Such national rules take precedent 
over art 23 of the Public Sector Directive if the legislation is compatible 
with EU law. 
 
Technical specification requirements must be expressly stated in contract 
documentation such as a tender notice. Technical specification may not be 
used in a way to hinder equal access for tenderers and cannot impede one of 
the main objectives of the Public Sector Directive, namely the opening up of 
public markets to competition.103  
 
Technical specifications must therefore be formulated in a precise way so 
that tenderers are able to assess what the contracting authorities are seeking 
to procure, in other words, the subject matter of the contract. The authority 
must thus state measurable requirements against which tenders can be 
prepared and objectively evaluated.  
 
References to technical specifications in contract documents must also be 
made in a certain prioritized order where national standards transposing 
European standards have the highest priority. Each reference to an 
international, European or national standard must be followed by the words 
“or equivalent”. Therefore, a contracting authority is prohibited from 
                                                
99 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 53(2) 
100 Arrowsmith, 2010, p. 176 
101 C-448/01, paras 50, 51 
102 Directive 2004/18/EC, Annex VI, 1(a) 
103 Bovis, 2012, p. 79 
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rejecting a tender that has clearly indicated its ability to comply with a 
standard equivalent to the one referred to in the contract documents.  
 
Technical specifications may not include information on required origin, 
production or special manufacturing, nor references to certain brands or 
patents. Exceptions might however be allowed if the technical specification 
refers to a certain brand followed by the term “or equivalent”.  
 
2.1.2.6 Contract conditions 
A contracting authority is also allowed to require that certain conditions be 
fulfilled after the contract has been awarded. These conditions are called 
contract performance conditions and may include requirements of a social 
and environmental nature.104  
For these conditions to be valid they must comply with Community law, be 
indicated in the contract notice or in the technical specification and can only 
relate to the part of the tenderer’s activity which is linked to the subject 
matter of the contract. A contract performance condition can therefore not 
target the entire operation of a tenderer as this would not comply with the 
principle of proportionality. It must also be possible to verify that the 
contract performance condition is fulfilled when the contract is 
performed.105 
 
2.2 Public procurement in Sweden 
The Swedish regime on public procurement is to a large extent based on EU 
directives such as the Public Sector Directive. This holds especially true for 
public contracts above states threshold values. Even regulation governing 
public contracts that fall below threshold values have come to resemble the 
regulation governing contracts above the thresholds.106      
The Public Procurement Act107 currently in force in Sweden was 
inaugurated the 1st of January 2008 and implemented the Public Sector 
Directive of 2004. According to CJEU case law, the provisions of the 
procurement directives and the TFEU have direct effect in the member 
states meaning that the states are bound by the provisions and the provisions 
can be invoked by private suppliers before Swedish courts, regardless of 
whether Sweden as a state has inaugurated the provisions properly.108 In the 
event of a discrepancy between Swedish law and EU directives, the 
directives usually take precedence.109   
Furthermore, the general principles of EU law are now explicitly included in 
Swedish procurement regulation and are consequently applicable on all 
                                                
104 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art 26 
105 Sundstrand, 2013, p. 160  
106 Pedersen, 2013, pp. 15, 7 
107 The Public Procurement Act (2007:1091) 
108 Arrowsmith, 2010, p. 66 
109 Sundstrand, 2013, p. 40 
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Swedish procurement, including contracts that fall outside the scope of the 
directives.110  
 
2.3 International agreements 
In 1994, the EU and its member states became parties to the Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA) signed within the World Trade 
Organization.111 The GPA means that the EU and the member states 
undertake to provide access for certain third countries to EU procurement 
markets and third countries that are parties to the agreement naturally have a 
reciprocal obligation.112 The provisions of the GPA are largely incorporated 
into the EU procurement directives, to facilitate its application. However, 
when awarding contracts, Member States are prohibited from discriminating 
tenderers or goods from third countries that are parties to the GPA.113 
 
In addition, the countries belonging to the European Economic Area have 
signed a particular agreement entailing that the same rules apply to them as 
the EU member states within the legal field of public procurement, at least 
for contracts above the threshold values.114 
 
The above section has presented the intricate legal framework governing 
public procurement in the EU. 
The thesis will now continue to address GPP in particular and how this 
policy instrument has been introduced into the public procurement 
regulation to achieve sustainable development.  
                                                
110 1 kap. 9 § LOU, 1 kap. 24 § LUF, 1 kap. 11 § LUFS och 1 kap. 2 § LOV.   
111 Council Decision 94/800/EC 
112 Arrowsmith, 2010, p. 56 
113 Sundstrand, 2012, p. 57 
114 Sundstrand, 2013, pp. 33-34 
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3 Green public procurement  
3.1 Environmental law and policy in the 
EU 
It is essential to study the evolution of environmental law and policy in the 
EU to understand how environmental concern in public procurement has 
gained recognition over time and led to the creation of GPP as a policy 
instrument to achieve sustainable development. This section will therefore 
present the most important regulation and policy in the field of 
environmental law in the EU.  
 
The original EEC Treaty of 1957 was signed at a time when the European 
countries were still recovering from the repercussions of the Second World 
War. Understandably, environmental protection was not the number one 
priority for the policy makers of the newly created Union.115  
 
By the early 1970s, environmental policy in the EU became increasingly 
important, as the EU grew aware of the acute and complex nature of 
environmental problems. The EU sought to create economic prosperity 
based on free trade theory but still acknowledged its responsibility not to 
allow a further deterioration of the environment in the name of free trade.116  
Public and scientific concerns on the limits to growth thus led the 
Commission to act and an environmental action programme was formulated 
in 1973.117 Moreover, the European Council expressly aligned 
environmental consideration with the pursuit of economic objectives in the 
Union, emphasizing the necessity for a harmonious development of 
economic activity and a balanced expansion.118  
 
Environmental policy first appeared as a way of achieving the single market 
objective but gradually gained independent recognition and an increase in 
status through various Treaty amendments.119  
 
The development of environmental policy in the EU has to a large extent 
been induced by the ECJ who in many respects has acted as a judicial 
lawmaker in furthering legal provisions of the EU that had become stagnate 
partly due to the requirement for unanimity voting.120   
Prior to 1987, when the Single European Act (SEA) entered into force there 
was no legal basis in the Treaty giving legislative competence to EU organs 
to legislate in the field of environmental law. Nevertheless, in 1985 the ECJ 
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stated in a landmark decision that environmental protection was one of the 
Community’s essential objectives and argued that the free movement rights 
were not absolute in the sense that they could not be limited by justifiable 
objectives such as environmental protection.121 Remarkably, environmental 
protection was given constitutional value by the ECJ without any substantial 
legal justification such as a reference to international or national law.122 The 
legislative authority of the EU on environmental law was formally 
recognized two years after in the SEA and environmental policy was finally 
expressly included in the Treaty.123 
 
After the SEA had entered into force, environmental legislation was drafted 
in the form of framework legislation, which meant that the member states 
were somewhat free to interpret the legislation according to their national 
views on environmental protection. Due to the vague formulation of this 
body of law, the ECJ remained as a significant judicial lawmaker as the 
Court was responsible for the uniform interpretation of EU law.124 The ECJ 
achieved uniformity by substantiating the provisions of environmental law 
and elaborated an intricate case law on environmental policy, often siding 
with environmental protection when given the possibility.125  
 
The Treaty presently in effect, the Lisbon Treaty on European Union (TEU), 
describes in Recital 9 and art 3(3) that a high level of environmental 
protection is one of the objectives of the EU along with an aim for 
sustainable development. These objectives are supplemented by the 
objectives set out in art 191 TFEU. Art 191 TFEU calls for a prudent use of 
natural resources, contribution to human health and the promotion of 
environmental protection at an international level.126 
 
Of particular importance is art 11 of the TFEU, stating that environmental 
protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of all other policies and activities of the EU, in particular 
with a view to promote sustainable development. Art 11 is called the 
integration principle and is to be interpreted widely to oblige European 
institutions to take environmental objectives into account in their policy 
making. There is no equivalent to this provision for a, sometimes, divergent 
interest to environmental protection such as the free movement of goods.127 
The integration principle is, however, not superior to other policy areas of 
the EU such as the internal market objective. The integration principle 
merely requires EU institutions to consider environmental protection 
throughout their decision making process.128 
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The ECJ has expressly referred to the principle in their case law when 
interpreting the previous public procurement directives to allow 
environmental criteria to be considered when contracting authorities are 
using the MEAT-criteria. Without the integration principle, it is 
questionable whether authorities would be able to consider environmental 
aspects in cases where it impedes the internal market objective.129  
 
It deserves to be mentioned that art 37 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (the Charter) bears many resemblances to art 11 TFEU in terms of 
requiring the integration of environmental concern in Union policy. 
Elements of art 3(3) TEU is also included in art 37 such as a call for a high 
level of environmental protection.  
The placement of an integration principle in the Charter might be interpreted 
as a way of ensuring individuals a “right to the environment”. However, the 
limited access to justice for non-privileged individual applicants in the name 
of such a right speak strongly against such an interpretation.130  
Art 37 appears to be no more than an additional legal source promoting 
environmental concern in Union policy making and adding an 
environmental dimension to the Charter.131 Art 11 TFEU is more 
forthcoming as it has been given the legal status of general principle of the 
EU and has, as mentioned above, been applied and expressly referred to in 
the case law of the ECJ. 
 
It is thus clear that the EU has grown into a multi-valued organisation where 
environmental objectives in procurement can no longer be automatically 
disapproved and distrusted for just curtaining protectionist behaviour.  
Environmental concern has instead gradually been integrated into public 
procurement regulation as a result of a transformed policy climate in the 
EU, due in large to the progressive case law of the CJEU132 and the 
subsequent express Treaty provisions describing high levels of 
environmental protection as an essential objective of the EU.  
 
The Treaty provisions also highlight that an integrated environmental 
concern in EU law should aim to attain sustainable development, which 
means to align interests of economic growth with environmental 
protection.133 The subsequent section will address EU general policies that 
particularly target sustainable development and describe GPP as an 
important policy instrument to achieve this objective.   
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3.2 EU general policies 
3.2.1 The Lisbon and Europe 2020 strategy 
The first strategy trying to align environmental policy with economic theory 
was the Lisbon strategy first launched in 2000 and then re-launched in 
2006.134 This strategy was aimed at making Europe “the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion”.135 The EU was believed to have a prime-mover advantage in 
green technology and the strategy therefore focused on the further 
development of resource-efficient processes and products to increase the 
EU’s global competitiveness by becoming more cost-effective. The Lisbon 
strategy acknowledged that public procurers could play a big role in 
achieving the goals set forth in the strategy by supporting and promoting 
innovation and especially eco-innovation in their procurement processes.   
 
In 2008, the financial crisis created an economic recession in Europe and the 
Europe 2020 strategy was thus elaborated by the Commission to help deal 
with the repercussions of this crisis.136 The strategy was also meant to target 
the imperfections of the EU growth model and set forth three prioritized 
areas of smart growth137, sustainable growth138 and inclusive growth139.  
GPP was now highlighted as a key market-based instrument to achieve the 
sustainable growth objective. The Europe 2020 strategy also underlined the 
importance of procurement policy ensuring the most efficient use of public 
funds and that public markets must remain open within the Union, 
especially when faced with economic crisis.  
 
Three out of seven “Flagship initiatives” meant to implement the Europe 
2020 strategy directly pinpointed public procurement and changed the role 
to be played by public procurement in the EU. The original purpose to 
safeguard the internal market objective by co-ordinating national 
procurement procedures was supplemented with an ambition to create a 
demand-side policy among public purchasers.140 First, the policy sought to 
facilitate the development of innovative industries by promoting the 
acquisition of innovative and environmental friendly products by public 
bodies. This development would ultimately increase Europe’s global 
competitiveness.  
Second, as economic actors of the EU were seen as having a prime-mover 
advantage in green technology, the policy sought to increase this advantage 
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by directing public sector demand towards products with high 
environmental performance to promote the further development of this 
technology. Third, public sector demand was to be used to further resource 
efficient products and energy from renewable sources in order for the EU to 
become more cost-competitive in global trade.141  
 
3.2.2 The EU Sustainable Development Strategy 
The Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategy were both essentially 
economic policies, even though they included references to environmental 
protection. The EU Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) was therefore 
created in 2001 after the Lisbon strategy had been adopted, and in 2006 it 
was renewed, and added “a third, environmental dimension to the Lisbon 
strategy”.142 This strategy sought to decouple economic growth from 
resource use, promote the development of eco-friendly technology and 
reduce environmental degradation.143 The idea was that by influencing the 
demand for eco-friendly and resource efficient products among public 
authorities, the development of such products would increase and public 
sector demand would ultimately influence private purchasers to “buy 
green”. Sustainable consumption throughout the economy would be the 
result.144  
 
In addition to the SDS, the sixth environmental action programme of the EU 
suggested that a wider use of environmental characteristics be used in 
procurement and that environmental life cycle assessments of products 
should be allowed.145 The seventh action programme has recently been 
adopted by the European Parliament and promotes incentives, standards and 
indicative targets for GPP to create a stronger market pull for green products 
and services.146  
 
The EU general policies clearly express high ambitions for GPP to reconcile 
economic interests with environmental protection to achieve sustainable 
development. The policies, however, seem to favour the term “sustainable 
growth” instead of sustainable development, which might imply that 
economic growth takes precedence of the environmental protection 
objective.  
Concern has been raised that in times of financial distress, economic 
dialogue might devour the environmental protection objective.147 However, 
considering how the EU chose to emphasize the importance of a continued 
                                                
141 Commission, 2010, pp. 14-16,  
142 Commission, 2001, ‘A sustainable Europe…’, p.2 
143 Commission, 2001, ‘A sustainable Europe…’, pp. 2, 7; Commission, Commission, 
2001, ‘Green paper…’, p. 9 
144 Commission, 2006; Commission, 2001, ‘Green paper…’, p. 9 
145 Council Decision 1600/2002 
146 Council Decision 1386/2013/EU 
147 Lee, 2005, p. 36 
 33 
focus on environmental issues in the Europe 2020 strategy, when faced with 
the financial crisis in 2008, such concern might seem unfounded.  
 
Nevertheless, the question remains on how to ensure that environmental 
policies are continuously observed and enforced alongside an increased 
intra-Community and global trade. The ECJ has been instrumental in 
safeguarding environmental consideration in the EU and its case law might 
thus provide an answer on how to find a proper balance between 
environmental and economic interests.   
 
3.3 Case law of the ECJ 
Much of the ECJ’s judging activity nowadays concerns the balancing of the 
sometimes-diverging interests of a functioning internal market and 
environmental protection. How the Court interprets relevant Treaty 
provisions and applies the general principles of the EU in its balancing 
exercise is thus important to understand the complexities linked to the 
objective of sustainable development as well as the progressive role of the 
Court in EU environmental law.  
 
The ECJ has been instrumental in interpreting Treaty provisions and 
policies in a way favourable to the environment to allow a further 
development of EU environmental law.148 The Court has continuously 
chosen an interpretation of the internal market objective that neither 
excludes the possibility for environmental concern, nor undermines the 
internal market. The Court has instead adopted a particular market mentality 
where environmental concern can be used to determine the boundaries to 
free trade objectives149, which will be presented below.   
 
Furthermore, the ECJ has instigated legislative action in the EU, as a result 
of its case law, such as the adoption of the Public Sector Directive in 2004. 
The Public Sector Directive was not merely adopted to eliminate barriers to 
the free movement of services and goods, but was also thought to reflect 
recent developments in the ECJ’s case law on issues related to the 
environment.150 Prior to 2004, the directives on procurement made no 
explicit mention of the possibility to include policy objectives such as 
environmental concern in the procurement process. Yet the Court had 
found, already in 1988, that such concern was compatible with the Treaty 
and the directives then in force.151  
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3.3.1 Beentjes & Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
In 1987, a review body from the Netherlands asked the ECJ to give a 
preliminary ruling in a dispute concerning a decision to award a public 
works contract.152 Beentjes had initiated proceedings against the 
Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries as Beentjes had submitted 
the lowest tender but was still not awarded with the contract. The 
contracting authority stated that Beentjes was not in a position to comply 
inter alia with a condition to employ long term unemployed persons and 
was therefore excluded.  
The Court was first faced with the question whether a condition stemming 
in social policy could be taken into account by the authority under the 
Public Works Directive then in force153 and second, if such a condition was 
considered valid, if the authority was obliged to notify the tenderers in 
advance of the condition.154 
First of all, the Court established that it was open to the contracting 
authorities to choose the criteria on which they proposed to base their award 
of the contract if they chose to use the most economically advantageous 
criteria, but the choice was limited to criteria aimed at identifying the 
economically most advantageous tender.155 
Moreover, the Directive then in force did not provide an exhaustive body of 
Community law and thus the member states remained free to maintain or 
adopt substantive and procedural rules in regard to public works contracts. 
However, this freedom was restricted with a requirement for the condition 
to fully be in line with all relevant Community provisions, in particular the 
free movement provisions concerning establishment and freedom to provide 
services.156 Furthermore, the Court stated that a criteria such as the 
employment of certain workforce, had to be given sufficient publicity by the 
contracting authorities by including it in the tender notice.157  
 
The conclusion to be made form this case is that the use of certain 
workforce criteria was not precluded by the Directive but had to be in line 
with relevant Community rules and principles and not be employed in a 
discriminatory manner. Even though the Court left it to the national court to 
decide whether the condition was discriminatory, it voiced concern that the 
condition could infringe the prohibition on discrimination based on 
nationality if the condition could only be complied with by domestic 
tenderers or if foreign tenderers had large difficulties in meeting the 
requirement.158 The ECJ thus accepts the inclusion of social criteria in 
procurement but is very careful not to restrict Community objectives of non-
discrimination and free movement. The ECJ can be said to have opened a 
small window for future environmental concern in public procurement but 
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the Community objectives of free trade and non-discrimination were still 
predominant at the time of Beentjes.  
 
In a subsequent and similar case to Beentjes, the Commission tried to 
substantiate the findings of the Beentjes case and elaborate a rule concerning 
the use of social criteria at different stages of the procurement process.  
In the case Nord-Pas-de-Calais159, the Commission brought a quite narrow 
infringement action against France for inter alia using as an additional 
award criterion a requirement for the promotion of employment in a French 
region. According to the Commission, social criteria could only be used as a 
contract performance condition as had been the case in Beentjes. The 
French contract notice had characterized the social criteria for 
unemployment as an award criterion and the Commission, on this ground, 
found the criterion to be in breach of the previous Public Works Directive as 
such criteria could only be based either on lowest price or the economically 
most advantageous tender.  
 
The Advocate General Alber sided with the Commission and further 
emphasized that in Beentjes, the condition to employ long-term unemployed 
persons had no relation to the award of contract criteria. The French award 
criterion was therefore in breach of the Public Works Directive.160 The AG 
further argued that the use of award criteria for social purposes would have 
a greater impact on the procurement process than contract performance 
conditions as it would be granted the status of sole, decisive award criterion 
and also did not serve to determine the most economically advantageous 
tender.161  
 
The Court disregarded these claims and found that the use of an additional 
award criterion linked to a campaign against unemployment was not 
precluded by the Directive as long as it was in consistency with the 
fundamental principles of Community law, with special reference to the 
non-discrimination principle derived from the free movement provisions.  
Also, such a criterion had to conform to all the procedural rules laid down in 
the Directive, in particular the rules on prior advertisement in the tender 
notice to ensure the principle of transparency.162 
 
Also, the Court explicitly rejected the view of the Commission that the 
condition in question in the Beentjes case was a condition for the 
performance of a contract and not an award criterion. As it had been used as 
the basis for rejecting a tender the Court found that the condition in fact 
constituted a criterion for the award of contract.163 
 
The main argument of the Commission was thereby disapproved and the 
Court reprimanded the Commission for merely criticizing the reference to a 
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social criterion as an award criterion in the contract notice. The Commission 
had negligently omitted to claim that the criterion was inconsistent with the 
fundamental principles of Community law, such as the non-discrimination 
principle, or that it violated the obligation to advertise the condition in the 
tender notice.164 
 
These two cases show that the use of social criteria was not automatically 
precluded but the Court could hardly be said to promote social and 
environmental concern in procurement in general.  
 
3.3.2 Concordia  
The ECJ’s ruling in Concordia can be described as a break through for GPP 
as the Court expressly addressed the possibility to integrate environmental 
protection in procurement.165 
 
Again the issue was whether an award criterion based in policy 
consideration was valid under the Public Works Directive and the general 
principles of EU law.  
The case concerned an outsourcing of the urban transport bus network in 
Helsinki where the contract was awarded based on the MEAT criteria. The 
awarding authority used three sets of criteria to assess which tender was the 
most advantageous overall to the city, namely the overall price of operation, 
the quality of the bus fleet and the operator’s quality and environmental 
management. The last criteria could lead to additional points for tenderers 
whose bus fleets emitted nitrogen oxide and gave rise to noise that fell 
below certain levels.  
 
Concordia was a company who was not awarded the contract, as its tender 
was not considered the most economically advantageous overall even 
though it had submitted the lowest price tender and had scored high points 
in the two criteria not related to environmental policy. Concordia therefore 
claimed that the award criterion favouring environmental performance was 
invalid under the procurement directives and discriminatory, especially 
considering that the only transportation firm that could provide a bus fleet 
that did not exceed stated levels of nitrous oxide and noise emissions, 
belonged to the contracting authority organising the tender procedure.  
 
The Court reiterated its position in Beentjes that contracting authorities have 
the liberty to determine which factors will be used for choosing the tender 
that is the most economically advantageous, provided that they are not of a 
discriminatory nature, comply with the fundamental principles of EU law 
and that the award criteria is clearly published in the contract notice.   
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The Court also referred to the integration principle in current art 11 TFEU to 
argue that the Public Works Directive did not exclude the possibility to 
incorporate environmental concern in procurement when assessing tenders 
according to the MEAT criteria as the Directive did not provide an 
exhaustive list of relevant factors to be considered.166  
 
It was consequently made clear that criteria used to determine the most 
advantageous tender do not have to be “of a purely economic nature”. The 
Public Works Directive expressly referred to the criterion of the aesthetic 
characteristics of a tender and environmental objectives could constitute 
such characteristics, which might influence the value of a tender without 
conferring a direct economic advantage upon the authority.167 
 
However, all criteria referring to environmental protection are not valid a 
priori, but have to relate to the subject matter of the contract, not confer an 
unrestricted freedom of choice on the authority and be properly published in 
the tender notice.168  
 
The Court did not find the award criteria to be invalid as levels of nitrogen 
oxide and noise emissions were linked to the subject matter of the contract, 
namely the provision of urban transport services.169 Moreover, awarding 
additional points to tenders which met certain specific and objectively 
quantifiable environmental requirements were “not such as to confer an 
unrestricted freedom of choice on the contracting authority” as they were 
clearly defined.170 Also, the award criteria fully complied with the 
requirement for prior notification and clear publication in the tender 
notice.171 
Lastly, the Court found that the environmental criteria in question were not 
discriminatory, even though the only tenderer able to comply with the 
criteria was linked to the contracting authority itself. The Court relied on the 
equal treatment principle, which is at the heart of the procurement 
directives.172 Firms that could provide bus fleets that met environmental 
requirements were not in an identical situation as firms who were unable to 
meet such demands and Concordia was thus not excluded from the award of 
contract on discriminatory grounds.173   
 
The Court in Bentjees and Nord-Pas-de-Calais can be said to have opened a 
small window for social and environmental concern in procurement as it 
acknowledged such considerations in principle. In Concordia, however, the 
Court finally opened the door for GPP, but still made sure to state that the 
intention was not to allow any type of environmental consideration in 
procurement enter through the door. The above stated requirements of e.g. a 
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link to the subject matter of the contract still had to be fulfilled to ensure a 
fair competition. Environmental considerations were thus clearly balanced 
against free trade objectives. The following case of EVN will further show 
how the balancing exercise evolved from being primarily occupied with 
traditional Community concerns of ensuring the functioning of the internal 
market to allowing environmental consideration to a larger extent.  
 
3.3.3 EVN 
The findings in Concordia as to the possibilities to use environmental 
objectives in award criteria were further developed in EVN where the limits 
to this possibility were in focus.174 
The issue at hand was an award criterion incorporating environmental 
objectives to determine the most economically advantageous tender. The 
Republic of Austria sought suppliers of electricity who could supply Federal 
offices with electricity from renewable sources as far as possible. The award 
criteria relating to the “effect of the services on the environment in 
accordance with the contract documents” was given a 45 % weighting. 
However, the contracting authority did not require evidence of where the 
electricity stemmed from as it conceded that it was technically difficult to 
establish such an origin. Furthermore, the award criterion was not limited to 
provision of electricity to the authority but also targeted the possibility to 
provide electricity to the public at large and favoured tenderers who could 
exceed the stated needs for electricity of the authority.  
 
As in Concordia, the Court sought to establish whether the award criterion 
was related to the subject matter of the contract, if it conferred an 
unrestricted freedom of choice on the authority, if the award criterion was 
expressly mentioned in the contract documents or the tender notice and if it 
complied with all the fundamental principles of EU law, in particular the 
principle of non-discrimination.175  
 
First of all, the Court established that the contracting authorities are not just 
free to choose the criteria on which they will award the contract, but also 
determine which weighting will be given to a particular criterion. The 
weighting must however enable an overall evaluation of the award criteria 
used to identify the most advantageous tender.176 
 
The Court also pointed out that the award criteria in question, promoting the 
use of renewable energy sources, was useful for environmental protection 
and the Community as a whole as it reduced greenhouse gas emissions, 
which the member states have all pledged to combat.177 
Nevertheless, the Court relied on the principle of equal treatment and held 
that tenderers must be in a position of equality both at the time when they 
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draw up their tenders and when those tenders are being assessed. The award 
criteria must be applied uniformly and objectively to all tenders in order to 
comply with the principle of equality178 and it must also be possible to 
verify that the award criteria has been complied with to satisfy the 
obligation of transparency in procurement processes.179 
 
In the present case, the contracting authority had made it clear that it did not 
intend nor was able to verify if the electricity from the tenderers was 
produced from renewable energy sources. The principle of equal treatment 
was thus not respected as the transparency and objectivity of the tender 
procedure was not ensured.180 An award criterion must be accompanied by 
requirements, which permit the tenders to be properly verified against the 
principles of Community law relevant to public procurement.181 
 
Furthermore, the award criterion was not considered linked to the subject 
matter of the contract as it distributed points to tenderers being able to 
supply an amount of electricity exceeding the stated needs of the contracting 
authority. The Court found that the subject matter of the contract was the 
supply of electricity to the contracting authority as stated in the tender 
notice and not to a non-defined group of customers.182 The award criterion 
in question was thus not compatible with Community law on public 
procurement.183 
 
The EVN case strengthened the requirement for award criteria to be linked 
to the subject matter of the contract, notwithstanding that the award criteria 
in question had environmental foregrounds and would have furthered the 
EU environmental policy to combat climate change caused by carbon 
emissions.  
The Commission for long held on to a distrustful attitude against GPP and 
called for a restrictive interpretation of the Directives then in force, 
favouring economic objectives of free trade.184  
 
The Court was also a bit hesitant towards policy considerations in 
procurement at first. At the time of Beentjes and Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the 
internal market objective was still in many ways prevalent and the Court’s 
argumentation was therefore largely focused on the free movement 
provisions and whether or not a certain social consideration created a 
hindrance to trade. The Court in these cases accepted social considerations 
in procurement in theory, when certain conditions were met, but it was still 
not possible to derive a promotion of GPP in general from the Court.185 
Environmental objectives however became more accepted in procurement as 
the policy climate of the EU evolved, to a large extent prompted by the 
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jurisprudence of the Court. At the time of Concordia and EVN, the Treaties 
expressly mentioned environmental protection as a Community objective 
and the Court seized this opportunity to interpret the procurement directives 
then in force more broadly to allow environmental concern in the 
procurement process.186 The innovative case law of the CJEU ultimately 
instigated legislative action and the Public Sector Directive was 
subsequently adopted in 2004.  
The Public Sector Directive reflected the preceding case law of the CJEU in 
terms of expressly addressing environmental aspects to procurement such as 
the possibility to include “environmental characteristics” in technical 
specifications and in award criteria on the MEAT basis.187  
3.3.4 Dutch Coffee 
It is consequently of great interest to examine a case decided after the 
adoption of the Public Sector Directive, as it expressly referred to 
environmental consideration in procurement.  
 
In the case Dutch Coffee188 from 2012, a Dutch contracting authority sought 
to purchase coffee and tea with specific eco- and fair-trade labels. The Court 
conducted a separate assessment of the ecological and the fair trade 
requirement. The Court characterized the ecological requirement as a 
technical specification and accordingly applied art 23(3) b of the Public 
Sector Directive. The article expressly stated a possibility for authorities to 
formulate technical specifications that include environmental characteristics 
and recital 29 of the directive further affirmed that such a characteristic 
might refer to a given production method.189 The Commission had long 
argued that a requirement for certain production processes and methods to 
be used was prohibited by the Directive if the requirement did not relate to 
the procured product’s characteristics at the stage of consumption, i.e. when 
the product is used, re-used, re-cycled or disposed of.190  
 
The Court judged the Commission wrong by concluding that such 
requirements are in principle lawful, do not have to relate to a product’s 
consumption characteristics and can be used as a technical specification. 
A referral to a certain production process or method such as a requirement 
for tea and coffee to be produced ecologically, must however be defined 
sufficiently. The duty of precision was derived form the principle of equal 
treatment191 and the obligation for a transparent procurement process. A 
technical specification must be defined in a precise way so that tenderers are 
able to make out the subject matter of the contract and know what is 
required of them.192  
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The Court proceeded to interpret the requirement for tea and coffee to bear a 
fair trade label and found that it could not be characterized as a technical 
specification as it did not relate to a production process or method. Instead it 
related to the conditions on which a putative supplier had purchased the 
product and was thus subjected to art 26 of the Public Sector Directive 
regarding contract performance conditions.193 
 
The Dutch authority had also employed award criteria to favour tenders with 
specific eco- and fair trade labels. The findings of the EVN case, where it 
was found that it was possible to use an award criteria requiring that 
electricity be produced from renewable energy sources, provided some 
guidance.194 The Court in Dutch Coffee interpreted EVN as meaning that an 
award criterion does not have to relate to an intrinsic character of the 
product, i.e. something that is part of its material construction, but can in 
fact refer to the product in question being of fair trade origin. Such a 
criterion would still be linked to the subject matter of the contract.195  
 
However, a criterion favouring products of fair trade origin must be defined 
with sufficient precision and it must be possible to verify tenderers’ 
compliance with the criterion. The duty of precision has already been 
discussed above and the duty of verification follows the same logic. The 
principle of equal treatment entails an obligation for authorities to ensure a 
transparent procurement process so that certain tenderers are not 
subjectively favoured to the detriment of others. Environmental criteria 
must thus be formulated in such a way as to enable contracting authorities as 
well as other tenderers to verify if the winning tender complies with the 
criteria or not.  
 
The conclusion to be drawn from this case is that how a contracting 
authority characterizes a certain environmental condition affects how the 
Court will interpret it as different rules apply to different types of 
conditions. Also, the Commission no longer opposes the possibility of using 
environmental criteria in procurement but duties of precision and 
verification still remain mandatory for authorities.196 
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4 Analysis of green public 
procurement and the new 
directive 
4.1 Green public procurement from a law 
and economics perspective 
The above sections have illustrated that the attitude in the EU towards GPP 
has undergone a dramatic change and is no longer considered primarily as a 
threat to the internal market objective.  
Instead, GPP has been aligned with the internal market objective in the 
Europe 2020 strategy, where it is described as a key market-based 
instrument to achieve both economic and environmental objectives of the 
EU. GPP has thus gradually received recognition for its potential ability to 
produce environmental as well as economic benefits.  
 
The previous sections have focused on the possibility to use GPP as a policy 
tool and the legal framework with which it must comply. EU environmental 
policy as well as EU general policy linked to GPP was described to show 
the evolution of EU environmental law and the environmental and economic 
objectives underlying the promoted use of GPP. Relevant case law of the 
ECJ was also presented to show how the Court balances sometimes 
diverging economic and environmental interests and how the relevant case 
law has contributed to the strengthening of GPP as an environmental policy 
instrument in the EU.   
 
This part of the thesis will proceed to discuss the practical and economic 
implications of using environmental criteria in procurement from a law and 
economics perspective. The economic background of GPP will first be 
presented along with a discussion of whether GPP can truly be described as 
a market-based instrument or if another denomination is more accurate.   
 
4.1.1 Economic thought and market-based 
instruments 
According to economists, the causes of, for example, climate change, are the 
underlying incentives shaping individual, firm and government decisions. 
These actors are perpetually imposing small costs on the earth’s population 
as a result of e.g. carbon emissions. If an individual is using a washing 
machine, driving a car to work or taking a bath, he/she is contributing to a 
degenerate ecosystem.197 The costs of deteriorating the environment are 
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however invisible to the responsible actor when the action takes place and 
will therefore be exterior to his/her decision process.198 The same holds true 
for firms engaged in economic activity.  
 
According to economic theory, this scenario is not a by-product of an 
efficient market, but rather a consequence of a market failure. The market 
has failed to provide individuals and firms with the right incentives to 
alleviate environmental problems. There is hence a need for markets that 
secure environmental protection by rewarding actors who contribute to 
climate stabilization.199  
 
A question arises whether these special types of markets arise by themselves 
or if they require governmental intervention. Adherents of a conservative 
wing argue that governments, for long, have installed cost-blind-statutes 
being overly intrusive and thus hindering innovation and economic growth.  
They adhere to Adam Smiths image of the invisible hand200 and claim that 
rational self-interested decision-making can combine to advance the 
common good without explicit coordination. Accordingly, free markets are 
socially desirable means of allocating goods and services.201 Conservative 
economists assume that markets consist of rational actors in possession of 
perfect information leading them to make decisions in line with the greater 
good of all. Such an ideological view of an efficient market leads to 
scepticism about regulation.202  
 
However, some economists admit that, even though some free markets will 
be efficient in allocating goods, they will still be unlikely to provide 
sufficient levels of environmental protection.203 The costs and benefits of 
environmental protection are not internalised in firms’ decision-making 
process and there is a lack of sound resource management.204 Market actors 
are in fact rarely in possession of perfect information to make rational 
decisions for the greater good of all.205 
 
Some economists therefore concede to the need for a regulatory push but 
favour market-based instruments to help remedy market failures and restore 
efficiency in the market rather than “command-and-control-type regulation” 
such as prescribing certain performance standards or the use of certain eco-
friendly technology.206 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has 
defined market-based instruments as ‘instruments that affect costs and 
                                                
198 Keohane and Olmstedt, 2007, p. 65 
199 Keohane and Olmstedt, 2007, pp. 3-4 
200 Hardin, 1968, p. 2  
201 Keohane and Olmstedt. 2007, p. 54 
202 Bogojevíc and Driesen, 2013, p. 2 
203 Keohane, Olmstedt, p. 55 
204 Keohane, Olmstedt, p. 64 
205 Known as “bounded rationality” (Mercuro and Medema, 2006, p. 245) 
206 Keohane and Olmstedt, 2007, p. 130-133 
 44 
benefits of alternative actions open to economic agents, with the effect of 
influencing behaviour in a way favourable to the environment’.207  
 
Market-based, or economic, instruments thus directly affect price 
mechanisms in the market and environmental taxes are a classical example 
of such an instrument. Environmental taxes forces economic actors to 
internalise the costs of environmental damage in their cost and benefit 
analysis (CBA) as high levels of, for example, carbon emissions result in 
higher taxes. An economic instrument can also function in the opposite 
direction by granting subsidies to economic actors contributing to emission 
abatement.208 The core of economic instruments is that economic actors 
have leeway to either decrease environmentally harmful behaviour or 
continue with “business as usual” and pay the price of environmental taxes.  
 
Regulatory instruments, or administrative, on the other hand, prescribe 
certain environmental performance or behaviour of economic actors. For 
example, the government might impose a requirement that certain 
technology be used to abate carbon emissions. Economic actors are 
consequently not free to choose whether or not to comply with the 
regulation as it is ‘commanded’.209  
 
The question is to which category GPP belongs. GPP is described as a 
market-based instrument in the Europe 2020 strategy but the question 
remains if this is an adequate description of GPP. 
 
GPP is not easy to categorise as it can assume both the role of an 
administrative instrument as well as an economic. It depends on how the 
criteria and requirements of the tender notice are formulated. If a public 
body seeks to procure products bearing a certain eco-label, as in the Dutch 
Coffee case, and includes this in their technical specifications, then GPP 
takes on the role of an administrative instrument, as a particular 
environmental standard is required and every tenderer has to comply with 
the same standard. GPP can also be characterised as an economic instrument 
if contractors are financially rewarded on the basis of the technology used in 
production.210  
 
GPP more often than not takes on the role of an administrative policy 
instrument as criteria is frequently formulated in terms of specific 
environmental certificates to be provided by tenderers or that emissions 
should be reduced with exactly the same amount by all tenderers.211 
It therefore seems peculiar that GPP is described as a market-based policy 
instrument in the Europe 2020 strategy. A possible explanation might be the 
voluntary element of GPP.  
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It is not mandatory for economic actors to participate in a procurement 
process and comply with environmental criteria of the relevant process.  
Instead, firms can decide whether it is economically advantageous to 
participate in a procurement process, based on a CBA. If the costs of 
adapting production processes in a sustainable direction outweighs the 
expected economic benefits of being awarded with a public contract, firms 
will choose not to participate, much like they will choose to pay an 
environmental tax instead of e.g. investing in green technology.212 
Economic actors thus have leeway to decide whether they want to conform 
to environmental criteria in a procurement process or instead suffer the 
economic loss of not being awarded with a public contract.  
GPP thus clearly affect the costs and benefits of alternative actions open to 
economic agents but not necessarily in a way favourable to the environment. 
If the costs of becoming more sustainable are considerable in relation to the 
economic benefits, economic actors will simply choose not to submit a 
tender and are not subjected to a tax or a fee for not participating in GPP.  
 
The rationale for GPP is, however, that the often substantial economic value 
of a public contract will in fact incentivise firms, including firms with high 
environmental impact, to participate in green procurement as the economic 
benefits will outweigh the costs of altering production processes in a 
sustainable direction.  
An increased uptake of GPP among public authorities will naturally 
encourage more economic actors to participate in GPP and sustainable 
development is meant to follow.213 
 
The next section of this thesis will therefore include an assessment of the 
challenges currently facing the mobilisation of GPP in the EU, in part due to 
inadequacies of the old Public Sector Directive. The demand and supply 
side of GPP will both be evaluated to understand the complexities linked to 
GPP.  
The new public procurement will first be presented to understand its 
background and purpose. Subsequently the innovative solutions of the new 
directive will be evaluated in light of the problematic practical implications 
of the old directive. Possible market reactions to an increased uptake of GPP 
will also be discussed as GPP is ultimately meant to transform the EU 
growth model to become more sustainable.  
 
The findings of this section will then be used to discuss whether GPP can be 
considered as an efficient policy instrument to achieve sustainable 
development, using the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency standard.   
 
                                                
212 ESO 2013:10, p. 71 
213 ESO 2013:10, p. 42 
 46 
4.2 Directive 2014/24/EU 
After the Europe 2020 strategy had been presented, the Commission stated 
that the old Public Sector Directive needed to be modernized to make way 
for the new role of GPP, which was to increase demand for innovative and 
green products.214 
The Commission had found that there was a great deal of uncertainty as to 
the legal possibilities of including environmental criteria in the tender 
documents and fear among member states of infringing Community law and 
principles.215 This uncertainty constituted a serious obstacle to the 
mobilisation of GPP216 and the directive thus needed to be clarified and its 
scope enlarged to encompass the enforced environmental and economic 
objectives of GPP.  
 
On 11 February 2014, the Council adopted a new directive on 
procurement217 to help reach the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy by 
modernizing the procurement directives and remedying the deficiencies of 
prior regulation.  
The new role of GPP is made clear already in recital 2 of the directive where 
references are made to the Europe 2020 strategy and GPP is described as a 
key instrument to achieve the objectives of the strategy including a smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth in the EU.  
 
The new directive has two complementary objectives to the original 
objective of co-ordinating national procurement procedures to protect the 
internal market objective. First the intention is to allow procurers to make 
better use of public procurement in support of common societal goals such 
as environmental protection and second to increase the efficiency of public 
spending in general.218  
 
These two additional objectives are however not enclosed with general 
mandatory requirements for environmental procurement or requirements 
obliging member states to address environmental aspects in all procurement 
processes. The differences between individual sectors of the procurement 
market have been found to be too vast to impose general obligations.219 
Instead the EU has installed two tracks of measures meant to strengthen 
market pull towards the production of eco-friendly products, called the twin-
track approach.220  
 
The first track takes into account the specificities of different sectors in 
procurement and promotes the installation of sector-specific mandatory 
standards. These standards are meant to impose higher standards than the 
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harmonised standards already in place concerning e.g. the general marketing 
of relevant goods, works or services in the EU.221 Such standards have 
already been installed regarding office equipment.222 
 
The second track of the approach concerns various regulations meant to 
motivate the voluntary use of GPP in sectors where there are no mandatory 
harmonised procurement standards. Such regulations include common EU 
GPP criteria, life-cycle costing methodologies, centralised and joint 
purchasing, indicative targets for the use of GPP and guidance for member 
states as to the legal boundaries in the EU of using GPP.  
The measures of the second track are mainly to be implemented through the 
new directive and will therefore be the main focus for the upcoming section.  
 
4.3 Challenges currently facing green 
public procurement 
Two documents describe how GPP is to be promoted in the EU, the 
Commission’s Sustainable Consumption and Production and Sustainable 
Industrial Policy (SCP/SIP) Action Plan and the Communication on Public 
Procurement for a Better Environment.  
These two documents identified five types of obstacles to the mobilisation 
of GPP in the EU. One of these obstacles was the restrictive meaning and 
legal uncertainty of the prior Public Sector Directive, to which the new 
directive presents a possible solution as already explained in the preceding 
section. The four remaining obstacles will now be addressed each in turn 
followed by the suggested solutions included in the new directive and/or in 
EU policy.  
 
4.3.1 Costs 
Eco-friendly and resource efficient products are often believed to be more 
expensive than conventional products without an environmental 
dimension.223 This increase in cost can cause reluctance among public 
bodies as they have a limited amount of resources and have to use it as 
efficiently as possible.  
 
Every effort from a public body to launch a policy instrument such as GPP 
inevitable increases costs and strain national budgets. Resources are needed 
when using GPP to require suppliers to conform to certain environmental 
standards, especially if this standard goes beyond what is typically required 
in the market. Such requirements can include demands that products be 
produced ecologically or that buses for a local transportation system must 
not emit high levels of carbon.  
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Furthermore, the EU procurement regime has for long been complex and 
rather unpredictable, especially before environmental consideration was 
expressly stated in secondary law and member states had to rely on the 
changing case law of the CJEU. The complexity still remains after the status 
of GPP has been raised in the directives as duties of precision and 
verification still burden the member states. The formulation of requirements 
and criteria in line with Community law and principles is a technically 
challenging endeavour and requires a lot of expertise.224  
 
This challenging legal exercise clearly requires resources to be executed 
properly, especially since member states risk infringement actions if they do 
not comply with EU regulation. In addition, when a public body has 
required a supplier to fulfil certain environmental conditions, there is a need 
to follow up with the supplier to ensure observance of the conditions, which 
further induces transaction costs.225 
Costs are thus created partly to ensure that a certain environmental policy 
complies with the relevant legal framework, partly to verify that the political 
ambitions of a policy are also achieved.  
 
The high costs currently linked to environmental concern in procurement 
poses a serious threat to the mobilisation of GPP as it makes member states 
more unwilling to engage in GPP, especially in times of financial distress 
where resources are immensely strained.  
 
The new directive therefore includes a number of solutions meant to reduce 
the increased transaction costs currently inherent in GPP.  
Measures presented in the following are not only meant to address the 
problem of high transaction costs but also serve to solve other problems to 
GPP. An introduction will therefore be given in this section of three 
important types of measures in part meant to reduce costs. The measures 
will then be reiterated in upcoming sections where they present a solution to 
other problems facing GPP.   
 
4.3.1.1 Life cycle costing 
A new provision in the new directive includes a possibility to consider life 
cycle costing (LCC) of a product, works or service when awarding a 
contract based on MEAT-criteria.226 This means that contracting authorities 
are encouraged to budget for all costs during the life cycle of a product. A 
high purchase price of an eco-friendly product might consequently be 
compensated by low operation- and maintenance costs during the whole life 
cycle of a green product. 227   
Member states have already been able to consider LCC when determining 
the economically most advantageous tender but the express stating of this 
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possibility in the new directive is meant to further facilitate, clarify and 
increase the use of this method.228 LCC is thus an additional support for 
member states in their promotion of sustainable growth.229   
 
LCC can be used as an award criterion favouring the tender with the lowest 
cost, as opposed to the tender with the lowest price. The preceding proposal 
for a new directive on procurement intended to replace the lowest price 
criterion for the award of contracts by a lowest cost criterion.230 This article 
was however up for negotiation and did not succeed in making it into the 
final directive. Instead, contracting authorities shall now base the award of 
contracts on the MEAT-criteria within which they can take into account 
either lowest price or lowest cost using a cost-effectiveness approach, such 
as LCC, to establish who has submitted the best tender.231  
 
All costs arising during the life cycle of works, supplies or services can be 
included in a LCC analysis. This entails both internal as well as external 
costs. Internal costs are those that fall directly upon the contracting authority 
or other users, e.g. cost due to development, production, transport use and 
maintenance of a product.232 External costs, on the other hand, are costs 
directly linked to the life cycle, namely negative externalities of 
environmental harm arising during the extraction of raw materials used to 
produce the product or simply environmental harm caused by the product 
itself. Examples of such external costs are green house gas emissions and 
costs arising from an effort to combat such climate changes.233  
External costs can be assessed in a life cycle assessment (LCA) provided 
that they can be given a monetary value, which must be possible to verify. 
LCA is an instrument for assessing a product’s total effect on the 
environment and the result of such an assessment is then added to the life 
cycle costing analysis. LCA is basically a contracting authority conducting a 
cost and benefit analysis (CBA) of a tender where the cost of conducting a 
CBA is also included and weighed against the expected environmental 
benefits of a certain product or service.234  
 
Furthermore, a life cycle assessment of external costs must be based on 
objectively verifiable and non-discriminatory criteria, be accessible to all 
interested parties and the data required by the contracting authority must be 
possible to be provided with reasonable effort by normally diligent 
economic operators.235 
 
Moreover, contracting authorities are required to indicate in their tender 
documents the method used to determine the life-cycle costs on the basis of 
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the required data. The elaboration of such methods often exceeds the 
expertise and limited resources of the authority.236  
 
The Commission anticipate that common methodologies on how to calculate 
life cycle costs relevant to specific sectors will be developed by the EU to 
alleviate this burden from the authorities. The new directive also allows the 
Commission itself to adopt common life cycle methodologies by way of 
delegated legislation.237 If the Commission adopts such a method, then 
contracting authorities are required to use that method when awarding a 
contract in the relevant sector based on life cycle costs.238 However, to this 
day only one sector is subjected to a common life cycle methodology and 
that is the sector of clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles 
covered by Directive 2009/33/EC.  
In all other areas of procurement, contracting authorities have to elaborate 
life cycle costing methodologies independently if they wish to use such 
measures. This is a serious impediment especially to the use of LCA as this 
assessment is complex both in terms of resources needed to conduct the 
assessment and in terms of the analytical expertise required of the 
practitioners. 
  
The Swedish Environmental Management Council (SEMCO) has stated that 
LCA is best suited for assessments of energy-intensive products such as 
lighting, office supply and ventilation. The SEMCO has further advised 
procuring authorities to focus primarily on internal life cycle costs due to 
the complexity of addressing external costs in procurement.239 
This recommendation has lead the Expert group in studies of public finance 
(ESO)240 to questions whether GPP can be viewed as an environmental 
policy instrument when the recommended primary task is not to internalise 
negative externalities but instead focus on the simpler task of analysing 
internal costs in procurement.241  
 
An assessment of external costs is often needed to assess whether GPP is 
efficient as an environmental policy instrument to achieve for example 
reduced levels of carbon emissions.242 If contracting authorities are advised 
against using such assessments they are excluding from the analysis 
important environmental concerns of combating global climate change, 
which is essential to the Europe 2020 strategy. One of the strategy’s main 
objectives is to attain sustainable growth through a low carbon economy and 
ensure resource efficiency. This objective will be severely impeded if 
contracting authorities are only inclined to address the possible 
environmentally harmful internal costs of a product.  
 
                                                
236 Kunzlik, 2013, p. 112 
237 Directive 2014/24/EU, art 68(3), 87 
238 Directive 2014/24/EU, recital 96(3), art 68(3) 
239 SOU 2013:12, p. 467 
240 Expertgruppen för studier i offentlig ekonomi  
241 ESO 2013:10, p. 55 
242 ESO 2013:10, p. 54, 55 
 51 
Road transport vehicles are a good example of a product whose internal 
costs of development and production might be developed to inflict 
minimum harm on the environment. However, the pollution that the vehicle 
inevitable will give rise to at the consumption stage is a negative externality 
with a far more serious effect on the environment than the internal costs of 
production and development of the vehicle, which is probably why there is 
already a common life cycle costing methodology in place for this type of 
product. 
 
It is thus of outmost importance that common life cycle methodologies are 
developed by the EU to facilitate the use of LCA as well as LCC to relieve 
contracting authorities from the burden of developing these complex 
methodologies themselves. Taking into account external costs are crucial for 
the attainment of environmental objectives.  
 
4.3.1.2 EU GPP criteria 
Contracting authorities of the member states are as mentioned subjected to 
duties of precision and verification in their development of technical 
specification and award criteria. Increased transaction costs are an inevitable 
result of these duties and the Commission has therefore suggested the 
creation of common GPP criteria to help reduce these costs.  
 
Common EU GPP criteria follow the same logic as common life cycle 
costing methodologies, namely the installation of clear, verifiable and 
justifiable environmental criteria for contracting authorities to use in their 
procurement processes to help alleviate the financial burden on authorities 
of developing such criteria independently.243 
Common GPP criteria are also meant to secure an undistorted competition 
among member states by making GPP criteria compatible throughout the 
EU. This will equally facilitate access to public contracts for small and 
medium size enterprises (SMEs) as they often have a limited capacity to 
master differing procurement procedures. 
 
EU GPP is far more developed than common life cycle methodologies and 
currently covers 21 product groups typically purchased by public bodies 
including electricity, copying paper and toilets and urinals. These sectors are 
prioritized areas and were chosen from a multitude of criteria such as the 
scope for environmental improvement, public expenditure, economic 
efficiency and the potential to set an example to private or corporate 
consumers.244  
EU GPP criteria are however optional to use, compared to common life 
cycle methodologies, which might explain why these criteria are currently 
more developed. Member states of the EU are probably more reluctant 
towards adopting common life cycle methodologies, as the new directive 
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now obliges authorities to apply them when using life cycle costing in the 
award criteria.245  
 
Two types of criteria are made available to contracting authorities when 
procuring goods from the sectors covered by EU GPP criteria. The first is 
the “core GPP criteria” which focus on the essential elements of a product’s 
environmental performance, thereby simplifying the application of GPP 
criteria and bringing down administrative costs. The second is the 
“comprehensive GPP criteria” which authorities can use if they wish to 
require higher levels of environmental performance and innovation or 
include more aspects that go beyond a product’s essential elements. 
Comprehensive criteria are derived from the core criteria and the differences 
between the two basically boil down to levels of ambition of the procuring 
public body.246  
 
4.3.1.3 Centralised and joint purchasing 
Another effort to help contracting authorities decrease transaction costs is 
the promotion and reinforcement of procurement through centralised 
purchasing bodies (CPBs) and joint purchasing, which is regulated in the 
new directive in art 37 and 38. 
 
CPBs are contracting authorities installed voluntarily by a member state 
with the objective to provide centralised purchasing activities. Such 
activities include the acquisition of supplies and/or services intended for one 
or several contracting authorities or the elaboration of framework 
agreements to be used by authorities for works, supplies or services.247 
 
Joint procurement is less institutionalised and systematic than centralised 
public purchasing and is defined as an agreement between two or more 
contracting authorities to perform certain specific procurement jointly.248  
 
The common and principal rationale of using CPB and joint procurement is 
to join the needs and purchasing powers of contracting authorities to obtain 
better prices. For the purpose of GPP, CPB and joint procurement can be 
used to generate cheaper prices for large volumes of environmentally 
friendly and innovative products.  
Transaction costs are also reduced, as contracting authorities do not have to 
initiate procurement processes separately.  
 
CPBs were allowed already at the time of the old Public Sector Directive249 
but the new directive has installed a specific article for CPB and introduced 
a new article for “occasional joint procurement” to further promote the use 
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of these two instruments.250 The new directive also clarifies that the 
enforced status of CPB does not preclude the use of joint procurement in 
any way, especially since joint procurement can help contracting authorities 
receive better prices for innovative products thereby promoting innovation 
in the EU.251 
 
Joint procurement and CPBs are thus both seen as a possible entry-door for 
GPP, as contracting authorities that lack knowledge or support for GPP can 
be incentivised to engage in such activities if transaction costs are reduced 
due to a joint effort in procurement.  
Installing a CPB or engaging in joint procurement is, however, in no way 
mandatory. Whether to have a CPB and how such a body should operate, 
depends on the level of ambition of the particular member state in relation to 
public procurement and GPP in particular.  
 
It is questionable whether the EU approach to encourage and clarify the 
possibility to use CPBs or joint procurement will increase the uptake of GPP 
in the EU as it is highly dependant both on the political ambition of each 
member state, if they choose to install a CPB or not, as well as the political 
will of each contracting authority to turn to a CPB or join forces with 
another procuring authority when engaging in GPP.  
 
4.3.2 Expertise deficit 
Compared to other traditional policy instruments such as environmental 
taxes, GPP is rather decentralised in its execution. Politicians on different 
levels of the national political system formulate policy objectives to be 
achieved by GPP but leave it to the individual contracting authorities to 
concretize these objectives into applicable environmental requirements and 
criteria in line with Community law and principles.252  
 
The possibility to use environmental criteria in procurement is as mentioned 
above no longer in question but the legality of a particular use of green 
public procurement depends largely on how a contracting authority 
formulates its environmental criteria. The elaboration of such criteria is as 
mentioned above a complex exercise and places a considerable burden upon 
contracting authorities.   
 
For long, member states have been hesitant towards incorporating 
environmental objectives in their procurement processes as the legal 
practicability of doing so have been surrounded by great uncertainties and 
member states have feared infringement actions.253 The elaboration of such 
criteria is a complex and technically demanding exercise and many of the 
contracting authorities lack the required expertise to formulate efficient 
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environmental requirements. Furthermore, authorities have been unaware of 
the eco-friendly products and solutions available on the market.254  
 
This deficit in expertise and knowledge clearly presents a barrier to GPP, as 
authorities are more unwilling to engage in activities where they experience 
a lack of competence or where they are unaware of the availability of green 
products.  
The new directive is therefore in large meant to simplify the complicated 
rules regarding GPP so that contracting authorities are more inclined to take 
environmental consideration into account and know what is expected from 
them.255  
 
The measures proposed by the new directive to decrease transaction costs 
are equally meant to address problems of expertise deficits among 
contracting authorities. Common EU GPP criteria and life cycle costing 
methodologies both serve the purpose of providing clear and easily 
applicable techniques to be used in GPP. Contracting authorities are thus 
relieved from the burden of elaborating criteria and methodologies 
themselves and do not need to fear infringement actions, provided that they 
have used the designated techniques properly.  
Moreover, centralised and joint purchasing allows the expertise in GPP to 
be concentrated, thus facilitating the use of environmental criteria in 
procurement.256  
 
The Commission has also launched several efforts to provide better 
guidance for contracting authorities wanting to engage in GPP. These efforts 
include guidebooks on the application of GPP under the Public Sector 
Directive and a website dealing exclusively with GPP which includes a 
“training tool kit” for GPP.257   
 
4.3.3 Political leadership and targets 
In 2012 the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) published a report 
on the uptake of GPP in the EU.258 The report showed that the uptake was 
very fragmented among member states where the four top performers 
exhibited an uptake of up to 60 % while as many as twelve member states 
displayed an uptake of less than 20 %.259 The uptake of GPP was 
established according to member states use of the “core” elements of EU 
GPP criteria. 
This fragmentation was partly explained by a lack of political leadership in 
the worst performing countries. The top performers had adopted national 
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256 Kunzlik, 2013, p. 108 
257 http://ec.europe.eu/environment/gpp/toolkit_en.htm 
258 CEPS Report, 2012 
259 CEPS Report, 2012, p. 5 
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action plans for the implementation of environmental concern in 
procurement at an early stage while others still lacked a national action plan 
at the time of the study.260 
 
Voluntary targets for increasing the uptake of GPP have been proposed by 
the Commission to help remedy this fragmentation. The idea is that political 
targets set by the Commission express the political support for a wider use 
of GPP and the Commission will also be responsible for the monitoring of 
the improvements made in GPP performance.261 The ambition is to help the 
current underachieving member states to increase their uptake of GPP to a 
level corresponding to the uptake of the high performing states.  
 
An ambitious target was set by the Commission in 2008 that by 2010, 50 % 
of public procurement processes in the EU would be green in terms of using 
all of the “core” elements of EU GPP criteria. This target was not met as a 
mere 26 % of public contracts included all of the core criteria. However, 55 
% included at least one EU GPP criterion.262 
 
Targets are easily set but clearly harder to achieve. Merely expressing a 
desire for underachieving states to catch up to the top performing states is 
unlikely to contribute to an improvement in the uptake of GPP.  
The Commission is to monitor the improvements made in GPP performance 
in the EU but the Commission has no authority to bring action or sanction 
states that do not meet the expected targets for GPP. Indicative targets are 
instead meant to motivate the voluntary use of GPP, which is highly 
dependent on the political ambition of the particular member state.   
 
In member states where the general public is ignorant of environmental 
problems or are struggling with high levels of political instability, GPP 
might not be a prioritised area on the political agenda.  
The related issue of fragmented public procurement demand in the EU will 
be further elaborated below.   
 
4.3.4 Fragmentation of public procurement 
demand 
As shown in the precedent section, the public demand for using GPP varies 
a lot between member states. Some states have installed ambitious guidance 
materials on GPP as well as CPBs to support the use of environmental 
criteria in procurement while others lack such political ambition.  
 
In addition, contracting authorities of the member states wishing to engage 
in GPP choose different ways of incorporating environmental criteria in 
their procurement processes. Environmental criteria have different value 
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depending on how they are formulated and when in the procurement process 
they are used. GPP criteria used in the technical specifications will require 
tenderers to comply with the requirement if they wish to submit a tender. 
Environmental criteria used as award criteria on the other hand will be given 
a certain weighting but may not result in a “green contract” as a tenderer can 
submit a tender scoring the highest points based on, e.g. lowest price.263  
 
Also, contracting authorities are autonomous bodies in relation to the policy 
makers at national and EU levels. The political ambition behind a policy 
instrument such as GPP might not be reflected in the practical execution as 
contracting authorities can choose to interpret the policy objectives 
differently.264  
 
Public demand is fragmented in the absence of common standards around 
which public demand can be aligned across member states.  
Centralised and joint purchasing can provide a solution, as the numbers of 
public purchasers and their demands are concentrated in one procurement 
process. The joint purchasing powers of the public bodies will also help 
improve the conditions for formulating strong environmental criteria.  
Also, developing EU GPP criteria and sector-specific life cycle costing 
methodologies will further enhance common standards and decrease varying 
environmental criteria.265  
 
Furthermore, the first track of the new directives “twin-track-approach” 
encourages the elaboration of mandatory sector-specific harmonisation 
standards in the EU. These standards prevent contracting authorities from 
procuring goods that do not meet required environmental standards. 
Fragmented public demands will thus be aligned in the sense that they have 
to meet or exceed harmonised standards.266 
Mandatory sector-specific harmonisation standards are, however, to the 
present day inadequately developed and only cover the office equipment 
sector267, which undermines the ability of such standards to align 
fragmented public demand.  
 
4.4 Market conditions for green public 
procurement 
The above section has focused on the demand side of GPP, i.e. how to 
promote an increased uptake of GPP among contracting authorities of the 
member states, in light of the challenges currently facing the mobilisation of 
GPP in the EU.  
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It is, however, equally important to assess the supply side of GPP and how 
the market is likely to react to a wider use of GPP by contracting authorities. 
Two topics will be discussed in the following that are linked to producer and 
consumer behaviour in the market, namely price sensitivity and the 
voluntary participation by producers in procurement processes. 
 
4.4.1 Price sensitivity  
Price sensitivity for changes in market prices among producers is an 
important question to discuss when evaluating the effect GPP is likely to 
have on the market.   
If a contracting authority seeks to substitute its procurement of conventional 
products for green products, the consumption and demand for green 
products will naturally increase.268 Whether this substitution policy will 
result in positive environmental effects is however in part dependent on the 
price sensitivity of producers. This price sensitivity is inter alia related to 
the potential for large-scale production advantages, i.e. when a product’s 
average production price declines as more units are produced.269  
 
If the price sensitivity of producers is low then the increased public demand 
for green products is not likely to result in environmental benefits. 
Producers will not be inclined to increase their supply to meet the demand 
as this might require quick investments to adapt their production process. 
The producer will thus consider the marginal costs270 to be too high to 
produce more green products, which is often the case at short sight.  
Low price sensitivity among producers can also be due to a distorted 
competition where there are few competitors in the relevant market. In this 
scenario, the prices for green products will increase as public demand 
increases but the production processes and supply of green products will 
remain the same.271  
 
If instead the price sensitivity of producers is high then an increased public 
demand for green products will not result in significantly raised prices for 
these products, as the marginal costs will be low to meet the increased 
demand. This is often the case in the long term when producers have already 
adapted their production processes to meet an increased public and private 
demand for green products.272 
The authority’s substitution policy towards green products in this scenario 
has better chances of generating environmentally beneficial results, as the 
supply of green products will increase without significant price raises and 
consumers will be inclined to purchase these products.273  
 
                                                
268 ESO 2013:10, p. 69 
269 Marron, 1997, pp. 285-305 
270 i.e. the costs of producing one more unit.  
271 ESO 2013:10, p. 69 
272 ESO 2013:10, p. 70 
273 Jörgensen, 2012 
 58 
Consumers’ price sensitivity is also important. Consumers’ price sensitivity 
is related to their income, how they value environmental quality and the 
price of the product.274  
If a contracting authority has a significant market share and decides to buy 
green instead of conventional products, the market prices for both types of 
products will be likely to be affected. The increased demand for green 
products will raise the price for these products while the reduced demand for 
conventional products will lower the price. Private consumers might then be 
more inclined to buy the conventional products because of the low price, 
which counteracts the authorities efforts to promote a wider production and 
consumption of green products.275  
 
It is therefore important to discuss whether a change of attitude among 
contracting authorities in favour of GPP affects private consumer behaviour.  
The efficiency of a market-based instrument is partly dependent on whether 
there is congruence between authorities environmental preferences and 
private consumer valuation of green products.276 If authorities efforts to 
procure goods in ways to secure sustainable growth leads to an increase of 
sale of cheaper conventional products among private consumers, then GPP 
actually results in greater environmental damage and should be avoided.277  
 
Recent studies in Sweden show that consumers appreciate environmental 
quality and the private consumption of ecological products is increasing 
from year to year.278 Whether this is a result of Sweden being a top 
performer in GPP or a growing awareness of environmental issues among 
the public is difficult to answer but it remains to be said that consumers’ 
price sensitivity is an important issue to address when discussing the 
potential efficiency of using GPP to alter market behaviour.  
 
4.4.2 Voluntary participation 
There is an important element of voluntariness on the supply side in public 
procurement as mentioned above.279 Potential suppliers can choose not to 
submit a tender in a green procurement process if the costs of complying 
with environmental criteria outweigh the economic benefits to be gained by 
being awarded with a public contract. GPP as a policy instrument thus have 
a limited scope of application as it only applies to suppliers who choose to 
participate in the procurement process, which differentiates GPP from other 
traditional economic policy instruments such as environmental taxes that 
apply to all economic actors operating in a particular market.  
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The effect that GPP is foreseen to have on the market, according to the 
Europe 2020 strategy, is thus largely dependent on the level of participation 
of potential suppliers.280 
 
The EU general policies, including the Europe 2020 strategy, have put 
much emphasis on how public procurement demand must increase to incite 
more firms to participate in green procurement.  
 
Consumer demand is, however, also an important factor to consider when 
discussing firms’ willingness to participate in a green procurement process. 
Suppliers often want reassurance that their green products will be sold in the 
private market and generate profit if they fail to submit the best tender in a 
GPP process.281 If the prospect of generating profit in the green private 
market is low due to low consumer interest for green products, then 
suppliers will not risk costly investments to accommodate the production of 
green products but instead focus on a continued production of conventional 
goods.282  
An increase of public procurement demand in green products must thus be 
met by a corresponding increase in private demand to ensure the efficiency 
of GPP to achieve sustainable development.  
 
Furthermore, the formulation of environmental criteria and requirements 
affect economic actors’ decision to participate in green procurement 
processes.283  
Stringent environmental criteria are more likely to deter possible tenderers 
from participating in GPP as costly investments in green technology will 
often be required to comply with the criteria. Stringent criteria are, however, 
often necessary to produce environmental benefits of value and secure a 
sustainable development.  
For GPP to be efficient in terms of generating a maximum of environmental 
benefits, it is crucial that firms giving rise to large quantities of negative 
externalities actually participate in GPP and alter their production processes 
in a sustainable direction.  
The voluntary element of GPP is thus countervailing the environmental 
objective of GPP as the largest polluters will not be embraced by GPP 
regulation.   
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5 Conclusions 
The identification of GPP as a key market-based instrument in the Europe 
2020 strategy has spurred a development in the EU where a wide use of 
GPP is strongly promoted and described as essential for the future 
competitiveness and growth of the EU.  
 
GPP follows the logic of art 11 TFEU and art 3(3) TEU to integrate 
environmental concern in the policy making and activities of EU institutions 
and member state authorities, with the intention to promote sustainable 
development, meaning the decoupling of economic growth and 
environmental deterioration.   
 
The concept of sustainable development is alluring as economic benefits 
will theoretically be achieved without considerable governmental 
interference in the market.  
The high ambitions set for GPP to attain sustainable development are, 
however, badly rooted in empirical data and research of how GPP actually 
operates in a market context, especially from an economic perspective.  
The encouragement of GPP in EU law instead seems to rest on simplistic 
political assumptions that if financially strong contracting authorities decide 
to alter their demand towards green products, this shift in public demand 
will create a snowball effect and the private market as a whole will become 
sustainable.  
 
Economic analysis of public procurement regulation should be the starting 
point of any policy suggesting the use of GPP to rectify or mend 
environmental problems and economic inefficiencies, as such an analysis 
can present economic weaknesses in political reasoning and legislation. 
 
GPP is described as a market-based instrument in the Europe 2020 strategy 
and such instruments clearly have their basis in economic theory. Yet, the 
promotion of GPP by the Commission is rarely founded in economic 
research or in studies that establish GPP as an effective economic policy 
instrument to achieve sustainable growth.  
The ability for GPP to generate environmental and economic benefits is 
instead assumed and a wider use of GPP is accordingly promoted.  
 
The focus in the EU general policies relating to GPP lies on how to change 
the environmental preferences of government authorities and how to legally 
enable authorities to take environmental aspects into consideration when 
procuring goods from the market.  
No reference is made in the Europe 2020 strategy to market conditions that 
might affect the efficiency of GPP, which is remarkable considering that 
GPP is a market-oriented instrument meant to transform the EU growth 
model to become more sustainable.  
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The discussion on the possibilities and limits to GPP is thus rather one-sided 
as it only considers the demand side of procurement, assuming that the 
supply-side is interrelated.  
This is clearly an inadequate approach, as an altered demand for green 
products among contracting authorities does not necessarily automatically 
transform the demand and supply of green products in the private market.  
 
This thesis has shown that the mobilisation of GPP to achieve sustainable 
development faces considerable obstacles both on the demand side of 
procurement as well as on the supply side. This is largely due to the fact that 
the costs of engaging in GPP often outweigh the environmental and 
economic benefits to be gained by participating in GPP.  
 
Contracting authorities of the member states, representing the demand side, 
are reluctant to engage in GPP due to the current high transaction costs 
linked to the elaboration of environmental criteria, the assessment and 
verification of tenders with an environmental dimension and the follow-up 
on contractors after a GPP contract has been awarded to ensure the 
observance of environmental contract conditions.  
Green products are in addition often more expensive to purchase, which 
further increases costs.  
 
In order for GPP to generate expected environmental benefits, it is essential 
that contracting authorities elaborate clear and ambitious environmental 
criteria. It is however a complex and demanding exercise to elaborate strong 
environmental criteria that fulfils a precise and verifiable environmental 
objective in accordance with ECJ case law, Community law and principles.  
 
The new directive and the EU general policies present several efforts to 
reduce transaction costs such as installing common EU GPP criteria that 
help alleviate costs of developing GPP criteria individually on a national 
level and promoting the use of CPBs and joint procurement to join the needs 
and powers of contracting authorities so that they will be able to inter alia 
gain better prices in procurement.  
 
Life cycle costing (LCC) methodology, as part of the MEAT criteria, has 
been particularly highlighted as an efficient solution to reduce transaction 
costs during the award phase. 
LCC assessments enable contracting authorities to assess all costs during the 
life cycle of a product to determine which supplier has submitted the best 
tender. A high purchasing price of a green product can thus be compensated 
by low maintenance costs and a long life span.  
A life cycle costing assessment is, however, not facilitating the use of 
environmental criteria in procurement but rather the opposite. Both internal 
and external costs can be taken into account in LCC and assessing such a 
wide range of costs that can occur during the whole lifetime of a product is 
of course a highly demanding exercise, both financially and technically.  
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Yet, well functioning LCCs present a great opportunity to secure 
environmental protection as negative externalities can be assessed and 
internalised in public authorities decision-making process in a life cycle 
costing analysis (LCA).  
The complexity of addressing external costs in procurement has, however, 
led the Swedish Environmental Management Council (SEMCO) to 
recommend Swedish contracting authorities to focus mainly on internal 
costs and reserve the assessment of external costs in a LCA for energy-
intensive products such as lighting and ventilation.  
Such a recommendation made by an authority of a high performing state in 
GPP, i.e. Sweden, questions the efficiency of using GPP to address negative 
externalities when LCA is perceived to be too complex and expensive in the 
average procurement process even for the authorities belonging to a state 
where there is strong political leadership promoting the use of GPP.  
 
The Commission has suggested that common life cycle methodologies for 
certain sectors be developed to facilitate the use of LCC assessments and 
LCAs but to this day only one sector is covered by such a methodology and 
that is the sector of clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles.  
Developing methodologies for the measuring of life cycle costs is still 
predominantly the responsibility of the individual contracting authority. 
Sweden has commissioned an expert body (SEMCO) to elaborate such 
methodologies for national use to make it easier for Swedish authorities to 
use environmental criteria. Sweden is, however, as mentioned one of the top 
performers in GPP. 
 
The major part of the proposed solutions of the new procurement directive 
to the challenges currently facing the mobilisation of GPP in the EU are 
measures intended to motivate the voluntary use of GPP. Mandatory sector 
specific standards and harmonised mandatory methodologies for LCC 
assessments currently covers very few sectors and the use of GPP is thus 
highly dependant on the political ambitions of the different member states in 
relation to GPP. Reports show that such ambition varies a lot between 
different member states where the top performers exhibit an uptake of 
environmental criteria in 60 % of the state’s procurement processes while 
the underachieving states employ environmental criteria in less than 20 % of 
their procurement processes.  
The fragmented green public procurement demand in the underachieving 
states threatens the objective of an EU-wide transition to a sustainable 
economy, which GPP is meant to support.   
 
In addition to the important question on how to increase the uptake of GPP 
among contracting authorities in the EU is the question of how the market is 
likely to react to an increased uptake of GPP.  
This thesis has shown that the efficiency of GPP in achieving environmental 
and economic objectives is largely dependant on the price sensitivity of 
producers and consumers in relation to changes in market prices due to 
GPP.  
 
 63 
 
Furthermore, GPP is described as a market-based instrument in the Europe 
2020 strategy but this thesis has shown that this denomination is not 
necessarily adequate to describe the particular features of GPP.  
GPP differs from other market-based instruments, as it does not directly 
address price mechanisms in the market such as taxes or subsidies. GPP 
only affects the costs and benefits of alternative actions open to economic 
agents that choose to participate in GPP and thus have a limited scope for 
application.  
Economic actors will decide whether or not to participate in GPP depending 
on how the environmental criteria are formulated and conduct a CBA based 
on the costs of complying with the requirements weighed against the 
economic value of being awarded with the public contract.  
  
GPP, however, does not necessarily affect costs and benefits in a way that is 
favourable to the environment as strong environmental criteria are likely to 
deter tenderers from participating in GPP if the costs of complying with the 
criteria will exceed the potential economic benefits that might be gained 
from winning the contract. The voluntary element of GPP therefore 
potentially impedes the prospect of attaining environmental objectives such 
as emission abatement, as high polluting firms will often not be incentivised 
to engage in GPP processes.  
 
Sustainable development is the core objective of GPP according to the 
Europe 2020 strategy, meaning the alignment of economic and 
environmental interests.  
The high transaction costs currently linked to GPP cast doubt upon the 
economic efficiency of using this instrument to achieve sustainable 
development. The environmental benefits generated by GPP must outweigh 
the costs for GPP to be considered efficient according to a Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency standard.  
For GPP to be efficient in terms of generating substantial environmental 
benefits, it must be assessed whether this instrument addresses negative 
externalities. This thesis has shown that it is a complicated exercise to 
conduct a LCA and authorities, even from the top performing states, are 
generally discouraged from conducting such an analysis.  
Furthermore, the elaboration of strong environmental criteria is likely to 
result in low participation of tenderers as mentioned above.  
GPP can be used to favour tenderers who already produce green products 
and have a high environmental performance but to achieve sustainable 
development, GPP must incite conventional producers to alter their 
production processes and become more sustainable.  
As GPP is currently regulated, it is questionable whether GPP will be 
efficient in achieving the goals set out in the Europe 2020 strategy.  
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